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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past eighteen months' there has been a flurry of activity by the United States Supreme Court concerning the rights of
the accused, with significant decisions regarding searches inci.
dent to arrests, 2 the potential conflict of interest in representing
more than one codefendant at trial, 3 the identification of suspects,' and double jeopardy.5 Both the United States Supreme
Court and the Supreme Court of Tennessee handed down decisions concerning the right of an accused to attack the accuracy
of a facially sufficient affidavit for a warrant.! The state supreme
court also sought to clarify the law of attempted crimes 7 and
established standards for the acceptance of guilty pleas.'
II.
A.

OFFENSES

Against the Person
1. Homicide

The recognition of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder is anomalous to the theory of lesser
included offenses because more is involved than the elimination
of one or more of the elements of the greater offense. Voluntary
manslaughter is homicide committed in a sudden heat of passion
1. This survey encompasses decisions published in the National Reporter
System from mid-1977 to the end of 1978. While the focus is upon Tennessee
criminal law and procedure, federal cases are included insofar as they concern
constitutional standards and therefore impact upon state criminal proceedings.
Citations to the following have been abbreviated as indicated: J. CooK,
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-PRETRIAL RIGHTS (1972) [hereinafter
PRETRIAL RIGHTS];

J.

COOK, CONSTITLTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AccusED--TRIAL

RIGHTS (1974) [hereinafter TRIAL RIGHTS]; J. COOK, CONSTrrTTONAL RIGHTS Or
THE ACCUSED-PsT-TRIAL

RIGHTS (1976) [hereinafter PosT-Tma

RiGhs];

Cook, CriminalLaw in Tennessee in 1976-1977-A CriticalSurvey, 45 TmN. L.
REv. 1 (1977) [hereinafter 1976-1977 Survey]; Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1971-A Critical Survey, 39 TENN. L. 11v. 247 (1972) [hereinafter 1971
Survey].
2. See text accompanying notes 168-95 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 233-45 infra.
4.

See text accompanying notes 253-82 infra.

5. See text accompanying notes 487-515 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 157-67 infra.
7.

See text accompanying notes 32-51 infra.

8. See text accompanying notes 415-18 infra.
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produced by adequate provocation,' a consideration wholly immaterial to second degree murder.' 0 The decision by the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Meilons" helped clarify the propriety of an instruction on voluntary manslaughter when the defendant has been charged with murder.
When the defendant requests such an instruction, if there is
evidence that, if believed, would warrant the jury finding the
defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter instead of murder,
the instruction is mandatory' Error does not result, however,
from failure to give an instruction on a lesser included offense for
which there is no evidentiary support,'3 and indeed such instructions should be avoided."
In other cases, the defendant charged with murder may object to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter or a finding of
that offense. A conviction of voluntary manslaughter will nevertheless be affirmed if, according to Mellons,
the evidence demands a conviction of a higher degree of homicide than that found by the verdict, and there is either no evidence in support of acquittal of the greater crime, or if there is,
the verdict of the jury clearly indicates that the evidence in
support of acquittal was disbelieved.

. . ,A

Under these circumstances the defendant has not been prejudiced by the finding of the less serious offense." The Mellons
court, however, recognized one situation in which giving an instruction on voluntary manslaughter over the objection of the
defendant is reversible error-if the evidence would support a
finding of either murder or involuntary manslaughter but not
voluntary manslaughter. Such a situation was present in Mellons,
but the jury returned a verdict of voluntary manslaughter and
9. See TNN. CoDz ANN, § 39-2409 (1975), construed in Smith v. State,
212 Tenn. 510, 370 S.W.2d 543 (1963), and Capps v. State, 478 S.W.2d 905

(Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1972).
10.

T9NN. CODE ANN. j§ 39-2401, -2403 (1975); id. § 39-2402 (Cur. Supp.

1978).
11. 557 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. 1977).
12. See State v. Staggs, 554 S.W.2d 620, 626 (Tenn. 1977); Johnson v.
State, 531 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tenn. 1975).
13. Owen v. State, 188 Tenn. 459, 221 S.W.2d 515 (1949).
14. Whitwell v. State, 520 S.W.2d 338, 343-44 (Tenn. 1975).
15. 557 S.W.2d at 499.
16. See also Reagan v. State, 155 Tenn. 397, 293 S.W. 755 (1927); Howard
v. State, 506 S.W.2d 951 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1974).
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imposed the minimum permissible sentence. This sentence, the
court concluded, "suggests that they would not have found the
defendant guilty of second degree murder if given the choice, as
they should have been, between that crime and involuntary manslaughter,"'" and the conviction was therefore set aside.
2. Rape
The admissibility of evidence regarding the victim of an alleged rape was the subject of two decisions. In Forbes v.State"
defendant moved prior to trial for a psychological examination of
the victim for the purpose of introducing "expert testimony to
impugn the credibility of the prosecutor and otherwise question
her competency as a witness and truthfulness."" The trial judge
denied the motion on the ground that there was no right to have
the victim examined. The court of criminal appeals affirmed the
conviction, finding "no authority in Tennessee that a trial judge
has the power, discretionary or otherwise, to compel such an examination."'' While affirming on certiorari, the Supreme Court
of Tennessee did not agree that the trial court lacked power to
order such an examination upon timely motion "supported by
compelling reasons or a showing of a particularized necessity for
such an examination."' At the same time, the court was unpersuaded by the idea of a mandatory rule,5 which it considered to
be inimical to the public policy favoring the alleviation of suffering of rape victims. 5 Instead, the court recognized the inherent
17. 657 S.W.2d at 500.
18. 559 S.W.2d 318 (Tenn. 1977).
19. Id. at 320.
20. Id.
21. Id. See also Ballard v. Superior Ct., 64 Cal. 2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49
Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1433 (1968).
22. The argument was made in Wigmore: "No judge should ever let a sex
offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and
mental makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician."
3A WiuMoRz, EvIDENcE § 924a (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
23. A woman raped is shorn of all her dignity. She is the victim
of the most humiliating, degrading and debasing of all crimes. We know
judicially that an alarming percentage of rape victims never make public complaint. This must be attributed in substantial part to the fact
that she is subjected to examination and cross-examination on the most
initimate details of the penetration and must testify to matters that are
not even discussed among intimate friends, but are the legitimate sub-
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power of a trial court to compel a psychiatric or psychological
examination of the victim "where such examination is necessary
to insure a just and orderly disposition of the cause." 4
A state statute3 bars the introduction into evidence of prior
consensual sexual activity of a rape victim except when relevant
to the issue of consent. In Shockley v. State" the Tennessee Court
of Criminal Appeals held that the statute was intended "to eliminate the unjustified besmirching of a woman's reputation by examining her prior sexual activities when such testimony is of such
a highly dubious relevance to the issue of her later consent or her
credibility."" That purpose was overshadowed in Shockley by the
fact that the strongest evidence against the accused was the pregnancy of the prosecutrix and medical testimony that conception
could have occured at the time she claimed to have been raped.
Under these circumstances evidence that the pregnancy was the
result of intercourse with another male would have been relevant
to the issue of guilt, and therefore the statute could not be used
to bar the introduction of such evidence. The court emphasized
that it was not declaring the statute unconstitutional but merely
limiting its application to the perceived legislative purpose.
3.

Incest

Under conventional rules of statutory construction, when two
statutes are applicable to a set of facts, but one of the provisions
is more particular in its application, the more particular provision
should control.2 In State v. Nelson" the accused sought to rely
on this principle in moving to dismiss indictments for carnal
knowledge of a female under twelve" because the acts charged
ject of inquiry in a courtroom crowded with the participants, the court's
retinue and the curiosity seekers.
559 S.W.2d at 320.

24. Id. at 321. "Such power should be invoked only for the most compelling reasons, all of which must be documented in the record." Id.
25. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2445 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
26. TENN. Arr'y GEN. Anwrtcr, Vol. IV, No. 2, p. 5 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
Feb. 8, 1978).

27. Id.
28. See 1A SANDS,

SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCON,

J§ 23.09, 23.16

(5th ed. 1973) [hereinafter IA SANDS].
29. TENN. Arr'y Gx. AssmAcr, Vol. IV, Nos. 5, 6, p. 7 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Oct. 3, 1978).

30. TENN.

CODE ANN.

§ 39-3705 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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came within the offense of incest.' The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that the rule of construction was inapplicable
because neither of the two provisions in question was more particular than the other. In the court's view the principle of statutory
interpretation could come into play only if one of the offenses
could be subsumed within the other. While the facts alleged in
Nelson would fit within either statute, the incest statute could
not be considered a more particular provision because the carnal
knowledge statute did not encompass all of the acts prohibited by
the incest statute.
4. Attempt
Attempt crimes have always been a source of confusion in
Tennessee, largely because the pertinent statute" is lodged
among a series of assault offenses" and indeed is partially defined
in terms of assault.
Assault with intent to commit felony-Attempt to commit

felony-Penalty.-If any person assault another, with intent to
commit, or otherwise attempt to commit, any felony or crime
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, where the punishment is not otherwise prescribed, he shall, on conviction, be
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding
five (5) years, or, in the discretion of the jury, by imprisonment
in the county workhouse or jail not more than one (1) year, and
by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500). '
In State v. Staggs- the supreme court made a laudable effort to
clarify the law of attempt. While the practical result of the holding is clear, the reasoning of the court is extraordinarily puzzling.
Defendant was indicted and convicted of assault with intent to
commit robbery with a deadly weapon. m On appeal defendant
complained of the trial court's denial of a jury instruction for
attempt to commit a felony under section 39-603. The court of
31. Id. * 39-705 (1975).
32. Id. 1 39-603 (1975).
33. Id. §4 39-601, -602, -603, -607 (Curn. Supp. 1978); id. *0 39-603, -604
(1975); id. §* 39-605, -606 (repealed by 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 937, * 10).

34. Id. § 39-603.

35. 554 S.W.2d 620 (Tenn. 1977).
36. TENN. CoD ANN. 4 39-607 (1975) (amended by 1977 Tenn. Pub. Acts
ch. 68, * 2).
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criminal appeals concluded that the trial court had committed
reversible error, and the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed.
The state maintained that section 39-603 was intended to
reach all attempts at crimes unspecified in sections 39-604
through 39-607 and also attempts at all crimes specified in these
sections when the attempts did not involve assaults. At the time
of the Staggs decision, sections 39-604 through 39-607 proscribed
assaults with intent to murder," to rape,8 to sexually abuse a
child," and to rob."' The state contended that because the attempt to rob in the present case took the form of assault, the
particular assault statute, section 39-607, rather than section 39603, was clearly the applicable provision. Moreover, a non
sequitur would result if section 39-603 were made a lesser included offense of the other assault statutes. Since an assault is
itself an attempt (in the context of these statutes), a charge under
section 39-603 would require proof of an attempted attempt.
Ostensibly rejecting the state's interpretation, the court said
that "all assaults are attempts"'" and that section 39-603 was the
"general attempt statute" in Tennessee. Therefore, while the
statute apparently defines two crimes, both are encompassed in
the rubric of attempt." This interpretation of the statute is eminently reasonable. The court's statement that the "most compelling reason" for its conclusion is that "[wle have no other such
statute"" is, however, less than satisfactory. Although the absence of a general attempt statute might well be a compelling
reason for the legislature to pass such a statute, it is not a compelling reason for the court to create one.
The court ventured upon even thinner ice by insisting that
if the state's interpretation of section 39-603 were adopted, "we
would [for example] have no such crime as an attempt to commit murder or rape."a As an examination of the state's position
makes clear, the court's reasoning is simply incorrect. Under the
Id. § 39-604.
38. Id. § 39-605 (repealed by 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 937, § 10).
37.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. § 39-606 (repealed by 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 937, § 10).
id. § 39-607 (Curn. Supp. 1978).
554 S.W.2d at 623.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id. at 624.
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state's interpretation of the statute, as quoted by the court,4 ' if
murder were attempted by means of an assault, the crime would
be prosecuted under the assault with intent to commit murder
provision.' 7 If murder were attempted without an assault, then
the crime would be prosecuted under section 39-603. Indeed, the
state's interpretation is entirely consistent with the court's objective in reading section 39-603 as a general attempt statute. The
section would cover all attempted felonies except when murder,
rape, sexual abuse of a child, or robbery were attempted by
means amounting to an assault. The legislature has determined
that the conduct in these instances deserves more severe punishment than other attempts, and therefore these attempts by assault have been particularly defined and accorded independent
ranges of punishment. The state's interpretation does not result
in the gap in the law feared by the court.
The court also ostensibly rejected the state's contention that
application of section 39-603 to the assault statutes would result
in a charge of attempted attempt. "Sec. 39-603 does not proscribe
an attempt to commit an assault with intent to commit a felony;
it proscribes an attempt (by assault or otherwise) to commit a
substantive offense, in this case robbery."" This reasoning, however, is tantamount to conceding the state's argument that the
attempt statute does not apply to the assault statute but rather
to the robbery statute. 4
Defendant in Staggs was not charged with robbery since no
property was taken but, instead, was charged with assault with
intent to commit robbery. If defendant is entitled to an attempt
instruction based on a lesser included offense theory, the attempt
must relate to the offense with which he was charged. Ultimately,
the court so held, noting that an attempt under section 39-603 "is
a lesser included offense within any felony"'" if no punishment for
attempt is otherwise prescribed.
The court concluded that "assault with intent to commit
robbery by means of a deadly weapon . . .embraces and includes: a. Assault with intent to commit simple robbery (without
a deadly weapon) . . . .b. Attempt to commit a felony. . . .c.
46. Id. at 623.
47. See TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-604 (1975).
48. 554 S.W.2d at 624.
49. See TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-3901 (Cum.Supp. 1978).
50. 554 S.W.2d at 624 (emphasis added).
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Assault and battery . . . . d. Simple assault . . . . " While
listing these potential charges under the heading "Lesser Included Offenses," the court implicitly recognized that assault and
battery is not a lesser included offense since proof of a battery is
not required for the greater offense. Defendant was therefore not
entitled to an instruction on that offense.
The court's reasoning suggests that the Staggs holding does
not mean a defendant is automatically entitled to an attempt
instruction whenever an aggravated assault is charged. In Staggs
the question whether an assault had occurred was apparently a
disputed issue. While defendant had a sawed-off shotgun in his
possession at the time of the attempted robbery, the proof was
undisputed that he did not point it at the victim. The jury might
have concluded that an assault had not occurred (either with or
without a deadly weapon), in which event the evidence would still
support a finding of attempt to commit a felony. The jury in
Staggs was denied this alternative by the trial court's refusal of
an attempt instruction. When the occurrence of an assault is not
disputed, Staggs does not necessarily require an instruction on
attempt under section 39-603.
B.
1.

Against Property
False Pretenses

The accused in Horn v. State5 2 had been indicted for taking
property under false pretenses 5 by selling clover seed under the
false representation that the seed was of a superior quality. The
trial court dismissed the indictment on the accused's motion that
he could be charged only with a misdemeanor under the Tennessee Seed Law 4 because that law addressed the conduct described
in the indictment more specifically and should be construed as
superseding the general criminal provision where applicable.
While not disputing the theory of statutory construction urged by
the accused,"' the Tennessee Supreme Court was not persuaded
that the Seed Law was applicable. " The pertinent provisions of
51.
52.

Id. at 626.
553 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn. 1977).

53.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1901 (1975).

54.

Id. §§ 43-921 to 934 (Cum.Supp. 1978).
See IA SANDS, supra note 28, § 23.26.
The court's position is well taken. A subsequently enacted specific

55.

56.
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the Seed Law prohibited sale of seeds "having a false or misleading labeling" or about which "there has been false or misleading
advertisement."" Since the indictment did not indicate that the
accused had engaged in any such activities, his conduct did not
clearly fall within the provisions of the Seed Law. Moreover, the
pertinent provisions of the Seed Law established a strict liability
misdemeanor punishable by a fine.-" The crime of false pretenses
required proof of fraudulent intent and was apparently directed
to more serious instances of criminal behavior. Conceivably, depending upon the evidence adduced at trial, the Seed Law prohibition might be a lesser included offense, but this possibility is
quite a different matter from concluding that the lesser offense
precludes a charge of the greater.
statute implicitly repeals those provisions of the general statute with which the
specific statute is in irreconcilable conflict. Tennessee-Carolina Transportation,

Inc. v. Pentecost, 211 Tenn. 72, 362 S.W.2d 461 (1962). When the statutes do
not irreconcilably conflict, however, the general statute is not repealed and the
specific statute merely exists as an exception to its terms. That two statutes
overlap in that both prohibit the same act does not, without more, make them
conflicting. 1A SANDS, supra note 28, §§ 23.09, 23.16. See also Chadwick v.
State, 175 Tenn. 680, 137 S.W.2d 284 (1940) (no implied repeal without identity
of subject matter and legislative purpose).

57.

TEN. CODE ANN.

§ 43-925 (Cum. Supp. 1978).

58. Justice Henry, dissenting, did not agree that the Seed Law had created
a strict liability offense.
To follow the majority's reasoning is to hold that it is made a criminal
offense in Tennessee to sell seeds that are merely incorrectly labelled,
irrespective of intent and scienter. False and misleading labelling to my
mind connotes affirmative, knowledgeable, false and deceptive action
as opposed to passive conduct in failing to insure that seeds are labelled
correctly.
553 S.W.2d at 739 (Henry, J., dissenting). It suffices to say that the language
of the Seed Law, "having a false or misleading labeling," refers to the label itself
vis-A-vis the commodity labeled and makes no reference, express or implicit, to
the party doing the labeling. "Regulatory" and "public welfare" penal statutes
quite often do not require mens rea. 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 23 (14th ed.,
C. Torcia ed. 1978). See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911)
(selling misbranded articles). Even if it be conceded, however, either that the
legislature did not intend to create a strict liability offense or that such an
interpretation would be inimical to due process in some instances, it does not
follow that the only alternative is to read a requirement of fraudulent intent into
the statute. To the contrary, the more likely construction would be a requirement that the seed seller either know of the mislabeling or be negligent in failing
to discover it. E.g., ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (Proposed Official Draft
1962) (acting negligently as culpable mental state). Under such a construction
false pretenses would continue to require a higher degree of culpability.
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2. Fraud
In prosecutions for drawing checks without sufficient funds5
a presumption of intent to defraud and of knowledge of the insufficiency arises if the maker fails to pay the holder the amount due
within five days after receiving notice of nonpayment by the
drawee." In Stines v. State" the accused received this statutory
notice after a preliminary hearing had been held and he had been
bound over to the grand jury. The accused argued that had he
paid the amount upon receiving notice he would have been compounding the offense." How this act would tend to compound the
offense as defined in the statute is not at all clear, and, not surprisingly, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the
argument. The offense of drawing a check with insufficient
funds is committed, if at all, at the time the check is drawn or
delivered. While under the previous version of the statute"l the
giving of written notice was an element of the offense, as a result
of the 1967 revision, refusal to pay after notice merely creates a
presumption of knowledge and intent; the prosecution may prove
the mens rea in other ways."
3. Forgery
State7

In Anderson v.
the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals distinguished the crimes of forgery" and uttering a forged
instrument" and held that an accused could be convicted of both
as a result of a single transaction. Defendant obtained a valid
check made payable to another individual and endorsed the name
59.
60.
61.

TENN. COD ANN. § 39-1959 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
Id. § 39-1960.
556 SW.2d 234 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
TNN. CODE ANN. § 39-3102 & -3103 (1975).

62.
63. "Payment at that time of the amount certainly owed as a civil debt
would do no more than nip in the bud any statutory presumption of guilty
knowledge and fraudulent intent." 556 S.W.2d at 235.
64. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1904 (1955).
65. See Meadows v. State, 220 Tenn. 615, 421 S.W.2d 639 (1967); Jones
v. State, 197 Tenn. 667, 277 S.W.2d 371 (1955); State v. Crockett, 137 Tenn.
679, 195 S.W. 583 (1917).
66. See also Jett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 236 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
67. 553 S.W.2d 85 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
68. TNN. Conr ANN. § 39-1701 (1975).
69. Id. § 39-1704.
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of the payee upon it in the presence of a grocery store cashier who
honored the full amount of the check. Defendant was convicted
of both offenses and given consecutive sentences." The appeals
court affirmed, holding that defendant committed forgery when
he signed the check and uttered a forged instrument upon offering
to transfer the paper to the cashier. The court recognized that the
two offenses were committed at the same place and virtually at
the same time, with the purpose of achieving a single result. The
court concluded, however, that "[ulnity of intent does not merge
the offenses,"'I and there was no evidence that the legislature had
intended a merger.
The dissent argued that, since the two crimes were proved by
the same evidence, a merger should be recognized. At common
law, however, forgery was defined as the false making or material
alteration, with intent to defraud, of any writing that, if genuine,
might be of apparent legal efficacy." The writing must be of such
nature that the rights of another might be prejudiced by the
forgery, but actual injury was not required.' While apparently a
matter of first impression in Tennessee, forgery and uttering a
forged instrument have been recognized as separately punishable
75
offenses elsewhere.
In Grizzle v. State7 ' the court of criminal appeals recognized
that uttering a forged instrument is a "specific and particular
species of false pretenses." 77 The charge of uttering a forged instrument, therefore, should be used whenever applicable to the
facts.
70. See text accompanying notes 432-34 infra.
71. 553 S.W.2d at 88.
72. Indeed, the multiple convictions could then be found to violate the
protection against double jeopardy. See POST-TRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 63.
73. Carr v. United States, 278 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1960); Mallory v. State,
179 Tenn. 617, 168 S.W.2d 787 (1943). See also 2 WHARrON's CuIMINAL LAW &
PROCEDURE § 621, at 396 (R. Anderson ed. 1955).
74. Ratliff v. State, 175 Tenn. 172, 133 S.W.2d 470 (1939); Girdley v.
State, 161 Tenn. 177, 29 S.W.2d 255 (1930). See also 2 WNArrON's CRIMINAL LAW
& PROCEDURE § 646, at 435 (R. Anderson ed. 1955).
75. See United States v. Peters, 434 F. Supp. 357 (D.D.C. 1977); Bronstein
v. State, 355 So. 2d 817 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978).
76.

TNN. Arr'v GEN. ABsTACT, Vol. IV, Nos. 5, 6, p.8 (Tenn. Crim. App.,

Sept. 11, 1978).
77. Id.
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Concealing Stolen Property

The word "concealing," as used in the offense of concealing
stolen property, is a term of art and should not be interpreted
literally."' In State v.Hatchett' the owner of two bird dogs discovered that his dogs had been stolen. The following day the
owner asked defendant, a dealer in dogs, if he knew of the dogs'
whereabouts. Defendant replied that he had purchased two dogs
from an unidentified man on the previous day and had since sold
them to another. After reimbursing the purchaser $200 and recovering the dogs, the owner swore out a warrant for defendant's
arrest, whereupon defendant paid him $500 for expense and trouble incurred. In sustaining defendant's conviction for concealing
stolen property,10 the Tennessee Supreme Court relied upon the
principle that unexplained possession of recently stolen goods
may lead to the inference that the possessor knew the goods were
stolen.! Defendant had no less concealed the dogs simply because
he had transported them to the purchaser in an open truck.12 The
fact that the sale was made within a very short time of acquisition
was evidence of an intent to make discovery of the theft more
difficult. While the admission of the sale the following day was
of some evidentiary weight, the repayment could be viewed as
consciousness of guilt. All in all, the proof was sufficient to support the conviction.
C.

Against Person and Property
1. Larceny from the Person

The statutory definition of larceny from the person provides
that "[t]he theft must be from the person; it is not sufficient
that the property be merely in the presence of the person from
whom it is taken."83 In Prigmore v. State' defendant took the
78. See 2 WHA rON'S CiMiNAL LAw & Pnocrwts § 670, at 290 (R. Anderson ed. 1955).
79. 560 S.W.2d 627 (Tenn. 1978).
80. The court of criminal appeals had reversed the conviction. Id. at 630.
81. See, e.g., State v. Veach, 224 Tenn. 412, 456 S.W.2d 650 (1970); Tackett v, State, 223 Tenn. 176, 443 S.W.2d 450 (1969).
82. "The crime of concealing stolen property does not require an actual
hiding or secreting of the property; it is sufficient to show any acts which render
its discovery more difficult and prevent identification, or which will assist those
stealing it in converting the property to their own use." 560 S.W.2d at 630.
83. TEiN. CODE ANN. § 39-4206(2)(a) (Cum.Supp. 1978).
84. 565 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977).
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purse of a woman seated on a park bench with her arm extended
over the purse at her side. Even though the victim had been
unaware of the seizure until she saw the thief running away, the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that the accused's
taking the purse satisfied the requirement of the statute."
A second issue raised by the defense was the refusal of the
trial judge to instruct the jury on the offenses of-a grand and petit
larceny. The offense of larceny is inevitably proven whenever
larceny from the person is proven, but the court nevertheless was
unwilling to recognize the applicability of the lesser included offense principle. The problem is a puzzling one analytically because, unlike robbery, larceny from the person cannot be said to
be an aggravated larceny." The punishment prescribed for larceny from the person, three to ten years imprisonment, is identical to that for grand larceny and is more than the punishment for
petit larceny." Larceny is therefore an included offense but only
petit larceny is a lesser included offense. The latter possibility is
not pertinent in the present case because the value of the goods
taken was sufficient to constitute grand larceny. Whether the
accused was convicted of larceny from the person or grand larceny
would seem unimportant since both carry the same potential
punishment. The defense might, however, believe that punishment would more likely fall within the low end of the range if a
conviction of simple larceny were returned. The position of the
Prigmorecourt was that offenses of larceny and larceny from the
person are exclusive, with the latter being applicable to "those
cases where the ordinary forms of larceny do not apply.""' This
explanation is curious since, had the prosecution in the present
case chosen to charge mere larceny, the conviction apparently
would have been sustained. Indeed, in the early case of Fanning
v. State," the court sustaided a conviction of larceny upon an
indictment for larceny from the person because larceny was
"necessarily included in the offense charged."" While conceding
85, "The purse was within the area between her arm and body, a natural
and normal place for it to be." Id. at 899.
86. Compare State v. Scates, 524 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. 1975); Watson v.
State, 207 Tenn. 581, 341 S.W.2d 728 (1960).

87. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 39-4204 (1975).
88.

Prigmore v. State, 565 S.W.2d at 899.

89. 80 Tenn. 661 (1883).
90.

Id. at 652.
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this, the Prigmore court nevertheless maintained that the offense
of larceny from the person was distinguishable because the value
of the property taken was immaterial." Since the evidence would
support a conviction for this offense, instruction as to any other
offense was unnecessary.
D. Public Offenses
1. Gambling

Proof that an accused is guilty of professional gambling2 may
be established by the frequency and amount of his wagers.' 3 In
Stroup v.State" the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held
that the acceptance of over three thousand dollars in bets from
an undercover agent during a two-week period was sufficient to
establish the offense. The court attached no significance to defendant's nonparticipation in the exchange of money or to his
lack of profit from the operation.
If the proceeds are dedicated exclusively to charitable purposes, however, criminal prohibitions are inapplicable." In Vance
v.State" the court of criminal appeals held that proof that the
operation was church-related was insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement that "no part of the gross receipts inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder, member or employee of such
organization,"" and that no part of the gross receipts go to other
than charitable purposes." While generally the burden of proof
rests on the prosecution to prove the elements of the offense
charged, "where certain categories of activities similar to the acts
which constitute a crime are exempted from criminal liability by
an independent section of the act defining the particular crime,
91. The court relied upon English v. State, 219 Tenn. 568, 411 S.W.2d 702
(1966), in which the court had said just that.
92. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2032 (1975).
93. Squires v. State, 525 S.W.2d 686 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id.
(Tenn. 1975).
94. 552 S.W.2d 418 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
95. TENN. CoDm ANN. § 39-2033(8) (1975).
96. 557 S.W.2d 750 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
97.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2033(8) (1975).

98. The statute defines "charitable organization" as organizations subject
to exemption under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 501(c)(3). See TENN
CODE ANN. § 39-2033(8) (1975).
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it is up to the defendant to bring himself within the exemption.""
The court cited a single case, Villines v. State,100 decided in 1896,
in which defendant had been convicted of unlawfully dispensing
pharmaceuticals. Defendant in Villines had contended on appeal
that the indictment failed to state that he did not come within
the statutory exception for physicians. In affirming the conviction, the Villines court relied on a United States Supreme Court
decision' 01 for the notion that the dispositive consideration was
the relationship of the exception to the definition of the crime:
"Is it so incorporated with the substance of that clause as to
constitute a material part of the description of the acts, omission,
or other ingredients which constitute the offense?"102 If so, then
the inapplicability of the exception should be alleged in the indictment. In Vance, since the charitable purposes exception was
not a material part of the description of the offense, the burden
of proof was at least initially on defendant.
At this point the proper result in Vance becomes problematical. The remainder of the opinion is'an extended quotation from
a treatise on criminal evidence,U generally supportive of the
Villines holding cited by the Vance court. Judge Galbreath, dissenting, however, quoted the same section in the same treatise:
"By weight of authority, when evidence appears which tends to
bring the defendant within an exception not located in the enacting clause, the burden of proof is on the prosecution, on the whole
case, to overcome the evidence beyond reasonable doubt."IL04 The
majority and the dissent disagreed whether evidence in the record
indeed tended to bring defendant within the exception. The dissent submitted that "[slubstantial proof was adduced that religious services and charitable works had been conducted by and
on behalf of the church,"'0 5 but the majority did not see this as
the crucial question of fact. The majority viewed the significant
point to be that "no evidence was presented tending to show that
no person benefited individually or that all of the gross receipts
99.

557 S.W.2d at 751.

100. Villines v. State, 96 Tenn. 141, 33 S.W. 922 (1896).
101.
102.
(17 Wail.)
103.
104.

105.

United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168, 176 (1872).
96 Tenn. at 145, 33 S.W. at 923 (citing United States v. Cook, 84 U.S.
168, 176 (1872)).
1WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EWiDZNCE § 20 (13th ed., C. Torcia, ed. 1972).
Id.

557 S.W.2d at 753.
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were used for benevolent, charitable or religious purposes."' 0' Defendant testified that the money derived from the gambling activity "went into the general fund of the church,"'0 7 but there was
no indication how the funds thus acquired were dispersed by the
church.
Since the enforcement of the statute may require a court to
pass judgment on church expenditures, a potential constitutional
problem of governmental entanglement in religion obviously is
presented.10 The allocation of a portion of income from gambling
sponsorship to a minister's salary probably could be justified as
coming within the exception. At the other extreme, should the
proceeds from gambling operations be allocated by the church
exclusively as compensation for the minister, particularly if this
is the major source of church income, statutory exemption appears unlikely. In any case, if there is some evidence of a bona
fide religious organization,' 0 ' judicial scrutiny of its operations
may be constitutionally impermissible. 1 In the final analysis,
the majority simply did not take defendant's religious pretensions
seriously. This attitude might cause some pause but for the fact
that defendant apparently did not take the pretensions too seriously himself since he filed a two sentence brief on appeal that
did no more than reiterate the statute."'

III.
A.

DEFENSES

Mental Impairment

1. Competency to Stand Trial
A defendant is considered competent to stand trial if "he has
mind and discretion which would enable him to appreciate the
106. Id. at 751.
107. Id. at 752 (quoting defendant's testimony at trial).
108. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674, 691 (1970); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 869-70 (1978).
109. In a concluding rhetorical flourish, the dissent submitted that the
organization served by defendant had been recognized as a church by both the
state and the Internal Revenue Service. 557 S.W.2d at 754. This observation
would appear to be a particularly strong argument for the defense were not an
inscrutable footnote appended: "It is not clear that documents admitted for
identification purposes only purporting to establish tax exempt status were in
effect at the time of appellant's arrest." Id. at 754 n.1.
110. See note 108 supra.
111. 557 S.W.2d at 75.

19791

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

charge against him, the proceedings thereon, and enable him to
make a proper defense.""' 2 In State v. Stacy"' the Tenneseee
Court of Criminal Appeals found "nothing offensive in allowing
a defendant's competency to stand trial to be induced by the use
of tranquilizing medication."" 4
In State v. Patty'5 the accused was arrested in connection
with the shooting of five people and sent to a state mental hospital for psychiatric evaluation." ' He was thereafter indicted on
three charges of first degree murder and two charges of felonious
assault, whereupon the prosecution moved that he be transferred
back to the county jail "for evaluation by independent psychiatric experts." The trial court ruled that the prosecution lacked
authority to demand an independent psychiatric evaluation, and
at the ensuing hearing the accused was found incompetent to
stand trial. The prosecution appealed the denial of its motion,
and the court of criminal appeals affirmed." ' Just as the defense
is not entitled to the appointment of a private psychiatrist,"' so
too the statute does not authorize the prosecution to obtain an
independent evaluation, and the denial of the motion by the trial
court was not an abuse of discretion.
2.

Insanity

When the jury is given an instruction on insanity, "' both the
prosecution and the defense may wish to apprise the jury of what
,would happen to the defendant if he were found not guilty by
reason of insanity. The prosecution may wish to impress upon the
jury that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is a verdict
112. Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 88, 135 S.W. 327, 329 (1911).
113. 556 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
114. Id. at 557. "In this modern age, the administering of drugs under
proper medical supervision has effectively restored many mentally ill citizens
to a useful life in which they can function as normally as other citizens not so
impaired." Id. at 557-58.
115. 563 S.W.2d 911 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977), cert. denied, id. (Tenn.
1978).
116. TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-708 (1977).
117. 563 S.W.2d at 913.
118. Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977),
119. The ALl Model Penal Code test for criminal responsibility was
adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531
(Tenn. 1977). See 1976-1977 Survey, supra note 1, at 18-20. Graham was accorded retroactive effect in Sampson v. State, 553 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn. 1977).
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of not guilty and, therefore, the defendant will be released from
custody as the result of such a verdict. The defense may wish to
assure the jury that following such a verdict the defendant would
still be vulnerable to civil commitment proceedings, possibly initiated by the prosecution. Tennessee courts have held that all
such instructions respecting the effect of finding the defendant
not guilty by reason of insanity are improper. in Edwards v.
State2 the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a defendant was
not entitled to such an instruction because it would not be relevant to the issue of guilt and "the trial judge is not supposed to
tell the jury what the legal effect of their verdict is."' 2 A majority
of jurisdictions are apparently in accord with Edwards. 2
The authority of Edwards was challenged in Glasscock v.
State, I in which defendant had been denied an instruction on
the possibility of hospitalization if he were found not guilty by
reason of insanity."4 Defendant contended that such an instruction was mandatory because of a passage in Graham v. State'5
acknowledging "a deficiency in Tennessee law relating to the disposition of a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of
insanity," and noting that "the district attorney-general may
120. 540 S.W.2d 641 (Tenn. 1976).
121. Id. at 648.
122. United States v. Borum, 464 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1972); Pope v.
United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Hand v.
Redman, 416 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Del. 1976); State v.Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 568 P.2d

1054 (1977); State v. Holmquist, 173 Conn. 140, 376 A.2d 1111, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 906 (1977); McCarthy v.State, 372 A.2d 180 (1977); Malo v.State,
361 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. 1977); State v.Dyer, 371 A.2d 1079 (Me. 1977); State
v.Bott, 246 N.W.2d 48 (Minn. 1976); State v: Black Feather, 249 N.W.2d 261
(S.D. 1976); Granviel v.State, 552 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); State v.McDonald, 89 Wash. 2d 256, 571 P.2d 930
(1977); Dodge v. State, 562 P.2d 303 (Wyo. 1977). Contra Taylor v. United

States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Wheeler v.State, 344 So.2d 244 (Fla.

1977); State v.Liesk, 326 So. 2d 871 (La. 1976); Commonwealth v.Mutina, 366
Mass. 810, 323 N.E.2d 294 (1976); People v.Cole, 382 Mich. 695, 172 N.W.2d
354 (1969); Commonwealth v.Mulgrew, 475 Pa. 271, 380 A.2d 349 (1977).
123.

124.

570 S.W.2d 354 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1978).

The requested instruction read: "When a person charged with a crim-

inal offense is acquitted of the charge on a verdict of not guilty by reason of

insanity, the district attorney general may seek hospitalization of the defendant
under [TNN. CODE ANN.J § 33-603 or § 33-604 as appropriate, if he determines
hospitalization to be justified." Id. at 355.
125. 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977).
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seek hospitalization."''
The court of criminal appeals in
Glasscock dismissed this language as dicta addressed to the legislature, largely prompted by the fact that such action on the part
of the prosecution was purely discretionary. The Glasscock court
saw no reason to believe the Graham court had intended to disturb its previous conclusion in Edwards.
In fact, the court noted legislative response had been forthcoming, albeit not in effect until some three months following
Glasscock's trial. The jury must now be instructed whenever insanity is an issue "that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity . . . shall result in automatic detention of the person so acquitted in a mental hospital or treatment center.""'
In the converse situation the Supreme Court of Tennessee
relied on Edwards in Sampson v. State, 1 holding it error to instruct the jury that if they found defendant not guilty or not
guilty by reason of insanity, that "in either of these events the
defendant would be a free man."'' Once again, in light of the
legislative response, such an instruction is now simply untrue."
126. Id. at 544.
127. TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-709(e) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
128. 553 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn. 1977).
129. Id. at 349 (emphasis deleted).
130. Few jurisdictions have addressed the precise issue raised in Sampson.
A similar instruction was held to constitute reversible error in People v. Morales,
62 App. Div. 2d 946, 404 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1978), because it unfairly prejudiced
defendant's insanity defense. An analogous situation arose in State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 224 S.E.2d 595 (1976). In his closing argument the district
attorney claimed that defendant would be "returned to this community" if the
jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. at 601. The trial
court's instruction to disregard the statement was held insufficient to cure the
prejudice to the defense. Rather, the trial court should have informed the jury
of the appropriate statutory commitment procedures. Similarly, in Johnson v.
State, 265 Ind. 639, 359 N.E.2d 525 (1977), the court observed that although
a defendant is not normally entitled to an instruction on dispositional consequences, if the jury is misinformed or misled (as by prosecutor comment), the
court should immediately inform the jury of the actual dispositional alternatives. But cf Jewell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 807 (Ky. 1977) (where
there is no realistic provision for detention of violent deranged people, prosecutor may remind jury that there is little assurance the defendant will not go
free if found not guilty by reason of insanity); Commonwealth v. McColl, 376
N.E.2d 562 (Mass. 1978) (trial court's instruction that defendant might be found
to be sane at a subsequent hearing, in which case he would go free, was not
error).
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PROCEDURE

Arrest

1. Warrants
Arrest warrants may be issued only by a "neutral and detached magistrate,' 3' a requirement that is primarily aimed at
precluding issuance by a party associated with prosecutorial authority.3 2 In Connally v. Georgia1 3 the United States Supreme
Court found the admonition equally applicable to the issuance of
a search warrant by a justice of the peace who received a fee when
a warrant was issued but no fee when a warrant was refused.13
In Tennessee justices of the peace are authorized to issue arrest
and search warrants' and are compensated in the same manner
as was the'case in Georgia.' 3 " In In re Dender'7 the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that the issuance of warrants by nonsalaried
justices of the peace violated both the federal and state constitutions.' u
2. Probable Cause
The prevalence of drug traffic through commercial airports
has led the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to develop
a "drug courier profile" that may be communicated to concerned
airport personnel. The profile includes the following factors: (1)
youthfulness; (2) the use of small denomination currency in the
purchase of tickets; (3) travel to and from major drug import
centers over short periods of time; (4) travelling alone; (5) empty
suitcases or no luggage at all; (6) nervousness; and (7) use of an
131.

Johnson v.United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). See also United

States v. Evans, 574 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978).
132. See generally PRETRIAL RJGHTS, supra note 1,

§ 16.
133. 429 U.S. 245 (1977).
134. "His financial welfare, therefore, isenhanced by positive action and
isnot enhanced by negative action." Id. at 250.
135. TENN. CODE ANN. § 19-312 (Cur. Supp. 1978).
136. Id. § 8-2115(A)I(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
137. 571 S.W.2d 491 (Tenn. 1978).
138. Id. at 492 (specifically found to violate U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV;
TENN. CONST. art. 1, §8). The court approved the same result reached earlier in
the year by the court of criminal appeals in an unreported case involving the
issuance of a search warrant by a justice of the peace. Birdsong v. State, Tenn.
Crim. App., Feb. 22, 1978 (unreported).
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alias."' In United States v.Lewis' 0 a ticket agent reported to a
DEA agent that a suspicious person, later the defendant, had just
purchased a one-day round trip ticket to Los Angeles with small
bills. He had checked a small suitcase that seemed empty but for
one item that slid around inside. The drug agent checked the
address that corresponded with the phone number provided the
airline by the purchaser and thereby determined not only that an
alias had probably been used in purchasing the ticket but also
that, according to the apartment manager, the individual had
been under surveillance by local law enforcement officers regarding suspected narcotics traffic. Further investigation disclosed
that the occupant of the apartment had been arrested for possession of heroin some two years earlier and that the description in
the police file matched that of the individual observed at the
airport. DEA agents met the return flight, informed defendant
that they believed he was in possession of heroin, and requested
him to accompany them to a small office. After receiving the
Miranda warnings, defendant unlocked the suitcase, and the
agent found a quantity of heroin. On appeal to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals from a conviction for unlawful possession of
heroin, defendant contended that at the time of the apprehension
and the search of the suitcase probable cause to arrest was lacking. In an earlier decision the same court had held that the drug
courier profile could not, by itself, provide either probable cause
to arrest or even sufficient suspicion for a temporary detention.'"
The Lewis court held that the drug courier profile "was not
a relevant factor" ' in the determination of probable cause to
arrest. The court reached this conclusion because first, the profile
was "too amorphous to be integrated into a legal standard""' and
second, use of the profile "would engage this Court in an improper
analysis.""' By the latter point, the court believed it was being
139. United States v.Smith, 574 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1978); United States
v.Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 863 (1977).

140. 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 863 (1977).
141. United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977).
142. 556 F.2d at 389.

143. Id. The court found that this profile, as the one in McCaleb, "'was
not written down, nor was it made clear to agents exactly how many or what

combination of the characteristics needed to be present in order to justify an
investigative stop or an arrest.'" Id. (quoting United States v. McCaleb, 552
F.2d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 1977)).
144. Id.
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asked to weigh "individual" layers of probable cause, as opposed
to the "laminated total.""' The distinction being drawn is quite
fine, for the court acknowledged the propriety of considering all
the facts that match the enumeration in the profile. Thus, one
may properly say: because facts a, b, c, and d"11 are present, this
plus additional information known to the officers established
probable cause. One may not properly say: because facts a, b, c,
and d are present, the suspect fits the drug courier profile; fitting
the drug courier profile plus additional information known to the
officers established probable cause.
In the context of Lewis the distinction may seem frivolous,
but the apprehensions of the court are entirely legitimate. First,
the profile is constructed by nonjudicial authority and, if taken
too seriously, runs the substantial risk of bypassing a judicial
determination of facts for the establishment of probable cause." 7
The problem is complicated by the fact that the profile will inevitably change with the experience of drug enforcement officers
and the persistent efforts of narcotics handlers to evade detection."' If the relevance of the factors and the reliability of the
profile must be determined in each instance, the prosecution has
merely inserted an intermediate step in its burden of proof, and
the court must still make an ad hoc evaluation of the facts.
Second, the Lewis court noted that the "use of the profile
could too easily result in giving an undeserved significance to
certain facts and distort the appraisal of the sum total of facts."'"
The danger sensed by the court is hypostatization, whereby a
concept achieves legitimacy as a fact.5 0 Thus, the several empirical observations in the present case are hypostatized into the
concept "drug courier." Once a court takes this step, the suspect
145. The phrases were taken from Smith v. United States, 358 F.2d 833,
837 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1008 (1967).
146. a = small bill ticket purchase; b = travel to and from major import
center in brief time frame; c = near empty suitcase; d = use of alias.
147. Cf. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (conclusory allegations in
affidavit for search warrant insufficient).
148. For example, once these profile characteristics are made public
through case reports, mass media, and the present article, one may assume that
drug couriers will buy their tickets with large bills, will wait until they reach
their destination before purchasing their return ticket, and will weigh down their
suitcases. So goes the war against crime.

149. 556 F.2d at 389.
150. See Ross, Th-Til, 70 HARv. L. REV. 812 (1957).
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thereafter is viewed as, in all probability, a drug courier. The
facts have been transposed into a value judgment, and this value
judgment thereafter is treated as a fact.'"' Appraising the facts in
Lewis, the court found probable cause to sustain the arrest independent of the drug courier profile.' 2
The "drug courier profile" was again the subject of attention
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
United States u. Smith.TU In Smith a narcotics agent observed
the accused deplaning in Detroit and was attracted to her by the
presence of several characteristics in the profile.' ' In addition,
the agent observed an abnormal bulge around the abdomen of the
accused which, on the basis of his experience, further suggested
that she was carrying illegal drugs. The agent detained the accused outside the airport and asked her to accompany him to the
office of the Drug Enforcement Agency in the airport. In the DEA
office the accused consented to a search of her carry-on bag and
purse. The accused was arrested upon discovery of marijuana in
the purse. A search of her person revealed a package of heroin
strapped to her body.
Applying the standard established by Lewis, the court concluded that the presence of several of the profile characteristics
151. The argument has been advanced frequently that ultimately no fundamental distinction exists between statements of fact, on one hand, and state-

ments of value or opinion, on the other. See B. RussLL, THE PROBLEMS OF
PILsopHY 7-12 (1959); E. D'Aacv, HuMAN AcTs 138 (1963).
Oliphant has contended that the difference between the statements, "This
is a table," and, "This injury caused the plaintiff to lose his hearing," is primarily "the number of items of sense experience constituting the basis of the infer-

ence in each case and the frequency with which the person involved is called
upon to draw the inference." Oliphant, Facts, Opinions, and Value-Judgments,
10 Tax. L. Rav. 127, 133 (1932).
Even assuming, however, that what the law traditionally treats as difference in kind is merely difference in degree, the court in the present case is
nonetheless justified in its preference for judicial scrutiny of each description of
observed phenomena, as opposed to a systematic organization of that data,
which comes closer to resolution of the ultimate question for the court.
152. The court found the facts substantially similar to those in United
States v. Prince, 548 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1977) (involving the work of one of the
same DEA agents), in which probable cause was found.
153. 574 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1978).
154. The agent observed that she was a "youth, carrying only a purse and
small carry-on bag and picking up no luggage at the airport, traveling alone and
being met by no one at the airport, and directly leaving the airport in a hurried

and nervous manner." Id. at 883.
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plus the abnormal bulge provided a sufficient basis for a temporary detention. While moving the accused from the point of detention to the DEA office exceeded the scope of authority to detain temporarily under circumstances short of probable cause,,'
the court concluded that the finding of the lower court that the
accused had gone to the office voluntarily was not clearly erroneous.' 6 The consent to search was likewise voluntary, and,
therefore, the evidence was properly admitted.
B.

Search and Seizure

1. Warrant Affidavits
The grounds upon which a facially sufficient search warrant
was issued may be controverted by the accused,' 7 but this right
has been judicially limited to a challenge before the magistrate
who issued the warrant.' In State v. Little'5 ' the Tennessee Supreme Court held that by virtue of a 1965 statute"" an attack
upon the affidavit may be made at a suppression hearing before
the trial court. Adopting the standard fixed for federal courts in
Tennessee, 6 ' the court held that two circumstances authorize the
impeachment of a facially sufficient affidavit: "(1) A false statement made with intent to deceive the Court, whether material or
immaterial to the issue of probable cause, and (2) a false statement, essential to the establishment of probable cause, recklessly
made." 2
Less than six months after the decision in Little, the United
States Supreme Court decided Franks v. Delaware'" and held
that an accused is entitled to a hearing to challenge the truthful155.

See PRETRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 60-62.

156. 574 F.2d at 886 n.15. Cf. United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 720
(6th Cir. 1977) (taking defendants to airport office after invalid Terry stop was
an unconstitutional arrest). Judge Edwards dissented in Smith, concluding that
the accused had been arrested without probable cause when she was taken to
the office. 574 F.2d at 887 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
157.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-514 (1975).

158. See, eg., O'Brien v. State, 205 Tenn. 405, 326 S.W.2d 759 (1959);
Solomon v. State, 203 Tenn. 583, 315 S.W.2d 99 (1958).
159. 560 S.W.2d 403 (Tenn. 1978).
160.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-519 (1975).

161. United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1975).
162. 560 S.W.2d at 407. See also Moore v. State, 568 S.W.2d 632 (Tenn.
Crim, App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1978).
163. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
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ness of factual statements in an affidavit upon "a substantial
preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by
the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false
statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.,"'' Notably, the standard articulated in Franks does not distinguish deliberate from reckless misstatements, and, in all events, requires
a finding that the statements in dispute were critical to the determination of probable cause. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit has now revised its standard to comply.'16
The Tennessee standard, therefore, is more protective in permitting the invalidation of the warrant when "intent to deceive
the Court" is present irrespective of materiality. While the Tennessee Supreme Court possibly will now conform its standard to
that adopted by the United States Supreme Court as compelled
by the fourth amendment, the Tennessee decision cited the state
constitution as well,"'" and nothing precludes the state court from
adhering to a standard affording a broader protection than that
required by the federal constitution.' °
2. Incident to Arrest
The permissible scope of a warrantless search incident to an
arrest was once again scrutinized in United States v.Chadwick,'1.

in which the United States Supreme Court for the first time drew
a distinction between the power to seize and the power to search
that which was seized. The accused was arrested while standing
164. Id. at 155.
165. United States v. Barone, 584 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1978).
166. 560 S.W.2d at 406 (quoting TENN. CONST. art. 1,§ 7).
167. But see State v. Wert, 550 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied,
id. (Tenn. 1977) (court of criminal appeals rejected the argument that TENN.
CONST. art. I, § 7, was broader than U.S. CONST. amend. IV). See 1976-1977
Survey, supra note 1, at 28. Even if the language employed in the respective
provisions is found to be functionally equivalent, however, the Tennessee Supreme Court can nevertheless construe the state constitution to afford greater
protection than the United States Supreme Court chooses to construe the Bill
of Rights to afford. See generally Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure Revisited, 64 Ky. L.J. 729 (1976); Falk, The State Constitution: A
More than 'Adequate' Non-Federal Ground, 61 CAUF. L. Rav. 273 (1973); Morris, New Horizons for a State Bill of Rights, 45 WASH. L. Rav. 474 (1970);
Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH.L. REv. 454 (1970).
168. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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next to the open trunk of an automobile in which he and others
had just deposited a 200-pound footlocker. The footlocker was
seized at the time of the arrest but was not opened until an hour
and a half later. At the time of the search, the locker was safely
in the custody of federal officers and was found to contain a large
quantity of marijuana."'
At trial the government attempted to justify the search as
falling within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement,170 but the court dismissed the relationship between the
footlocker and the automobile as purely coincidental. The government did not pursue this argument on appeal but instead argued
that the inherent mobility of luggage was analogous to the mobility of automobiles, a factor frequently noted in justifying the
warrantless search of vehicles,."' The Court responded that the
key factor was "the diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the automobile.'" In contrast, a footlocker was not sub-

ject to similar governmental regulation and was frequently intended as a container for personal effects. Moreover, the
"mobility" argument carried little weight because the footlocker
was in the exclusive control of the authorities.' "With the footlocker safely immobilized, it was unreasonable to undertake the
additional and greater intrusion of a search without a warrant.""'
169. Prior to the arrest, officers had probable cause to believe the footlocker contained marijuana, the contents having been identified by a
marijuana-sniffing dog while the container was in transit. Probable cause is not
a prerequisite to seizing or searching an item seized incident to an arrest, but
the reasonable assumption of the officers as to the contents of the footlocker was

significant, first, in providing probable cause for the arrest, and second, in
precluding any claim "that the footlocker contained explosives or other inher-

ently dangerous items, or that it contained evidence which would lose its value
unless the footlocker were opened at once." Id.
at 4.
170. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
171.
172.

See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
433 U.S. at 12. "'One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor

vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's
residence or as the repository of personal effects.' " Id. (quoting Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)).
173. Id. at 13. This distinction is substantially neutralized by the Court's

recognition that "we have also sustained 'warrantless searches of vehicles...
in cases in which the possibilities of the vehicle's being removed or evidence in
it destroyed were remote, if not nonexistent.'" Id. at 12 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973)).

174. Id. at 13.
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In Chambers v. Maroney"5 the Court had been unimpressed
by the argument that fourth amendment values would be better
protected by seizing a vehicle without a warrant, but not searching it until a warrant had been obtained,' Once again, the Court
found the greater expectation of privacy in the footlocker in
Chadwick to warrant a different conclusion.'"
Finally, the Chadwick Court addressed the government's attempt to justify the search of the footlocker as simply a search
7" the Court had held
incident to an arrest. In Chimel v.California'
that both the person and the area within reach of the arrestee
could be searched incident to an arrest. "' The seizure in
Chadwick, the government reasoned, fell within the permissible
scope of a Chimel search, and in United States v. Robinson" and
Gustafson v. Florida,'8' the Court held that a cigarette pack
seized from the person of the arrestee could be examined for its
contents after the object was in the exclusive control of the arresting officer. The latter cases were distinguishable from Chadwick
in that the search occurred at the moment of the arrest and seizure, while the search in Chadwick was remote in time and place
from the arrest. H2 Chimel had articulated the justifications for
the warrantless search incident to arrest as the protection of the
arresting officer, the preclusion of escape, and the prevention of
destruction of evidence.IR Since none of these dangers were present in Chadwick, the search was invalid.
The dissenting justices in Chadwick"' contended that the
search would doubtless have been legitimate had the officers ei175. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
176. Id.at 51-52.
177. It was the greatly reduced expectation of privacy in the automobile, coupled with the transportation function of the vehicle, which
made the Court in Chambers unwilling to decide whether an immediate search of an automobile, or its seizure and indefinite immobilization, constituted a greater interference with the rights of the owner.
This is clearly not the case with locked luggage.
433 U.S. at 14 n.8.
178. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
179. See Cook, Warrantless Searches Incident to Arrest, 24 AiA. L. REV.
607 (1972).
180. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
181. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
182. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
183. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763-64.
184. 433 U.S. at 22-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.).
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ther waited for the vehicle to leave, leading to a bona fide vehicle
search, or searched the footlocker at the time of the arrest. Apparently, however, the opinion of the Court left no room for either of
these possibilities. The Court was unequivocal in its assertion
that the contents of a footlocker are constitutionally distinguishable from the contents of an automobile'" and that the reasonable
expectation of privacy in the footlocker should not be diminished
merely because the locker is placed in a vehicle. As to the second
possibility, while a search of the footlocker at the scene of the
arrest would make the case comparable to Robinson and
Gustafson in one respect, this fact should not lightly be assumed
to be the only distinction in the case. In a final footnote to the
opinion the Court observed that "[ujnlike searches of the person, . . . searches of possessions within an arrestee's immediate

control cannot be justified by any reduced expectations of privacy
caused by the arrest. Respondents' privacy interest in the contents of the footlocker was not eliminated simply because they
were under arrest."'86 Such reasoning presumably would apply
equally whether the search was made at the time of the arrest or
at a later time in a different place.
Chadwick thus indicated the existence of gradations of intrusion upon reasonable expectations of privacy. Certainly the arrest
and search of the person of the accused were invasions of privacy,
arguably more intrusive than the search of the footlocker. The
warrantless arrest for a felony is nevertheless justifiable once
probable cause is established,'87 and the search of the person satisfies reasonable protection interests recognized in Chimel. The
search of the footlocker, however, involved independent privacy
interests, in respect to which the chain of reasonableness had
been broken.
Privacy interests at an earlier stage in the confrontation were
considered in the per curiam opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Mimrnms, '1 a case that may be
viewed as a logical extension of Chadwick, although that decision
185. "The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do
In sum, a person's expectations of
not apply to respondents' footlocker ....
privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile."

Id. at 13.
186. Id. at 16 n.10 (citation omitted).
187.
188.

See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421-23 (1976).
434 U.S. 106 (1977).
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is not cited. The accused in Mimms was stopped for the purpose
of issuing a traffic summons for the expired license plate on his
automobile. An officer requested that the accused alight from the
vehicle and produce his driver's license and owner's card. A large
bulge was noticed in his jacket, and thereupon the officer frisked
the accused and discovered a loaded revolver.
No question was raised as to the reasonableness of stopping
the vehicle for purposes of issuing the citation for a violation
observed by the officers. Nor was there any doubt that, once the
bulge was observed, the frisk and ultimate seizure were justified."' The critical issue was the intermediate step: "[Wihether
the order to get out of the car, issued after the driver was lawfully
detained, was reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth
Amendment.' t" The Court concluded that the order was reasonable because the major intrusion upon the liberty of the accused
occurred when he was detained. "We think this additional intrusion [getting out of the car] can only be described as de
minirnis.,'191

The similarity to Robinson and Gustafson on one hand, and
the contrast with Chadwick on the other, is obvious: Just as the
examination of the contents of a cigarette pack is a minor intrusion given a legal arrest and seizure of the object, so asking
Mimms to alight from his automobile added little to the intrusion
already occasioned by the detention. The footlocker in Chadwick,
on the other hand, was protected by privacy interests independent of the arrest of its possessor. Additionally, while in
Robinson, Gustafson, and Mimms the arresting officer reasonably
could claim that the action taken was for self-protection, no such
countervailing interest was present in Chadwick.
Lower courts have tended to find exceptional circumstances
that will serve to broaden the scope of a Chimel search. If, for
example, in the course of an arrest the arrestee must go into
another portion of the premises prior to being taken into custody,
the Chimel area follows the arrestee.112 In Watkins v. United

States, " after the accused was arrested in his residence, the offi189.
190.
191.
192.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
434 U.S. at 109.
Id. at 111.
See PaRETIAL RIGHTs, supra note 1, § 44 at 291 n.9

Supp. 1978).

193.

564 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1977).

& n.9.12 (Cum.
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cers followed him into his bedroom to get a shirt. The officers
seized a firearm, the butt of which they observed under the mattress of the bed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit sustained the admission of the evidence.
A stricter approach was deemed appropriate in United States
v. Rowan,"' in which an officer of the National Parks Service
observed a can of beer on the dashboard of a car, and, after
advising the accused that beer was not permitted in the park, the
officer asked to see his driver's license and vehicle registration
papers. The accused entered the car on the passenger side and
endeavored to open the glove compartment, which was stuck.
Simultaneously, the officer seized a crumpled brown paper bag
that was visible under the seat on the driver's side and, after
opening it, found seizable evidence within. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee suppressed
the evidence, holding that the bag was "not only too far from the
defendant but also located in an area too difficult to reach, for
the seizure to be justified under Chimel. ""'
3. Exigent Circumstances
The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is utilized when the facts indicate that delaying the search
until a warrant is obtained is impossible or unwise." If, for example, officers have reason to believe that a person within given
premises is in need of immediate medical attention, a warrantless
entry is reasonable, and evidence of criminal behavior fortuitously discovered may be seized.'" Similarly, officers in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon may enter a residence without a warrant for
purposes of making an arrest,, and evidence discovered in the
process is seizable. 18
Exigent circumstances are not created, however, simply by
the subject matter of the investigation. In Mincey v.Arizona'"
the prosecution sought to justify a four-day warrantless search of
the apartment of the accused under a so-called "murder scene
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

439 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
Id. at 1022.
See generally PRRTIAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 49.
Id. at 317 n.12.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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exception" recognized under state law.m The United States Supreme Court held that no such exception existed and that the
search could not be justified under any recognized exception. The
accused could not be said to have relinquished a reasonable expectation of privacy either because the crime had purportedly
occurred on his premises 3 ' or because he was under arrest before
the search occurred.20 No emergency existed that would support
the search as an effort to protect life or limb." 3 Despite a vital
public interest in the prompt apprehension of a murderer, the
deprivation of fourth amendment rights could not be the price of
police efficiency.3 '
4.

Open Fields

In 1977 in State v. Wert" the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the open fields exception to the warrant requirement, first recognized in Hester v. United States,2' had been
modified by Katz v. United Statesm to the extent that any warrantless search must henceforth be evaluated in terms of a reasonable expectation of privacy.20 The application of the open
fields exception arose again in Sesson v. State,3 ' in which officers
200. State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320, 518 P.2d 570 (1974); State ex rel. Berger
v. Superior Ct., 110 Ariz. 281, 517 P.2d 1277 (1974); State v. Sample, 107 Ariz.
407, 489 P.2d 44 (1971).
201. In any event, the "murder scene exception" as defined by the Arizona
Supreme Court applied to places other than the residence of the accused. "We
find nothing in the Constitution . . . which should prevent the police from
making a warrantlesa search of the premises in which the victim is found dead
and this is true even if the suspect exercised joint control of said premises along
with the victim." State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. at 409, 489 P.2d at 46.
202. The Court reasoned, analogously to United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1 (1977), that the invasion of privacy caused by the arrest did not compromise the separate privacy interest in the apartment. 437 U.S. at 393-94.
203. "All the persons in Mincey's apartment had been located before the
investigating homicide officers arrived there and began their search. And a fourday search that included opening dresser drawers and ripping up carpets can
hardly be rationalized in terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search." 437 U.S. at 393.
204. Id.
205. 550 S.W.2d I (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
206. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
207. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
208. See 1976-1977 Survey, supra note 1, at 28-30.
209. 563 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1978).
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had placed under surveillance a still located in a wooded area and
on three occasions had observed the accused illegally manufacturing whiskey. The court of criminal appeals found Wert distinguishable because no evidence in Sesson indicated that the accused was either the owner or the lawful possessor of the property
involved. Nor was there any assertion of a right of privacy similar
to the "no trespassing" signs in Wert. The court concluded that
the surveillance was therefore justifiable under the open fields
doctrine.
Judge Tatum, in a concurring opinion, was inclined to go
beyond drawing factual distinctions and preferred to challenge
the authority of the Wert holding, which he noted had not been
embraced by the state supreme court in that or any other case.
In Wert the court had placed substantial reliance on a federal
district court decision 210 that had been effectively overruled by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 1 '
Indeed, Judge Tatum concluded, "Insofar as I know, Tennessee
'
is the only American jurisdiction protecting open fields."? ?
The court in Wert, however, did not make the sweeping pronouncement attributed to it by Judge Tatum. It said only that
the scope of the open fields exception must be limited by the
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy concept, a point recognized by the United States Supreme Court' as well as by numerous lower courts.21' Two courts from other jurisdictions, in recent
decisions involving facts substantially similar to those in Wert,
have come to the same conclusion. In State v. Chort"5 the accused occupied an unenclosed ten-acre tract of land, within which
was a garden enclosed by a board fence with apprqximately four
inch spaces between the boards. An officer rode horseback across
the open pasture portion of the property, and, from a vantage
point some thirty feet from the garden fence, he recognized mar210. United States ex rel. Gedko v. Heer, 406 F. Supp. 609 (W.D.Wis.
1975).
211. United States ex rel. Saiken v. Bensinger, 546 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir.
1976).
212. 563 S.W.2d at 804. Judge Tatum had dissented in Wert. See 550
S.W.2d at 3.
213. Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861
(1974).
214. PrrauAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 60 at 368 n.4.
215. 577 P.2d 892 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).
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juana plants growing in the garden. The Court of Appeals of New
Mexico found the search unreasonable, holding that
[tihe "open field" doctrine must be viewed in light of the facts
of each case subject to the requirements of Katz ....
. ., [D]efendants, by the placement of the garden surrounded by an almost solid five foot fence, exhibited an actual
expectation of privacy. Further, this expectation of privacy was
such that society would recognize as reasonable. It would not be
unreasonable to expect the shielding of the garden was for the
purpose of privacy.'
In State v.Byers"7 an officer, acting on a tip from a hunter,
entered the 640-acre tract of the accused and discovered marijuana in cultivation. The property was not fenced, but, as in
Wert, "no trespassing" signs were posted. Distinguishing Hester,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded that the accused had
a reasonable expectation of privacy.
As the Supreme Court of Colorado observed in People v.
McLaugherty,'18 "Hester is now viewed as merely an application
of the principle that Fourth Amendment protections do not
apply where no reasonable expectation of privacy exists." '' In
finding the search in Wert unreasonable, the Tennessee court did
not foreclose sustaining warrantless searches under the open
fields exception when no reasonable expectation of privacy has
been invaded.22

5. Third Party Consent
Consent to a search may be effective when made by a party
other than the accused if that party has an interest in the area
searched comparable to that of the accused.2 2 ' In United States

v.Matlock 2' the United States Supreme Court held that such
consent was binding on the accused, notwithstanding his presence at the time consent was secured. In Matlock the officer did
not ask the accused for his consent, but in United States v.
216. Id. at 893 (citations omitted).
217. 359 So. 2d 84 (La. 1978).
218. 566 P.2d 361 (Colo. 1977).
219. Id. at 363.
220. Indeed, the court again reached such a conclusion in Delay v. State,
563 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1978].
221. See PREmTRL RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 53.
222.

415 U.S. 164 (1974).
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Sumlinm the officer asked for the accused's consent and it was
denied. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sumlin found no
constitutional significance in this additional fact because the rationale of Matlock was that a joint occupant has no reasonable
expectation of privacy to the extent that he assumes the risk of a
co-occupant exposing a commonly shared area. The refusal of the
accused to give his consent was immaterial to the question of
reasonable expectation of privacy.
This conclusion is not incompatible with the attitude of the
Court in Mattock, given the fact that the accused in that case was
present at the time consent was obtained from the third party. A
few lower courts, however, have concluded that Matlock is distinguishable when the party in interest is present and objects to the
search, notwithstanding consent by the co-occupant,14 or when
the police have been advised that an absent co-occupant objects
to the search.22

6.

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

When a search has been determined invalid, not only is the
evidence that was immediately seized in the course of the search
2
excluded, but any fruits of the search are likewise inadmissible. '
In Bentley v. Staten' officers searched a motel room occupied by
defendant under a warrant found to be based on an affidavit of
insufficient particularity.m' Marijuana and purportedly obscene
photographs discovered in the search were clearly inadmissible.
The photographs, however, led to the arrest and search of a codefendant, which produced additional photographs introduced in
evidence against the first defendant as well. The court of criminal
appeals held that the second search was the fruit of the first, and
the product was equally inadmissible.
One of the more troublesome fruit of the poisonous tree problems arises when prosecution witnesses have been identified
through an illegal search and the defense contends that their
223. 567 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1977).
224. People v. Reynolds, 55 Cal. App. 3d 357, 127 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1976);
Silva v. State, 344 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1977); Lawton v. State, 320 So. 2d 463 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
225. People v. Reynolds, 55 Cal. App. 3d 357, 127 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1976).
226.

See PRrRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 71.

227. 552 S.W.2d 778 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
228. See PRrrRIL R Gurs, supra note 1, § 36.
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testimony should be excludedYm This issue was addressed by the
Supreme Court for the first time in United States v.Ceccolini. m

While visiting a flower shop, an officer picked up and examined
the contents of an envelope, thereby discovering evidence of gambling activities. An employee identified the accused, who had
been under investigation for gambling activities, as the owner of
the envelope. The following year, the accused testified before a
federal grand jury that he had never taken policy bets. The employee testified to the contrary, and the accused was indicted for
perjury. At trial the employee's testimony was excluded as the
fruit of what was conceded to be an illegal search, and the ruling
was affirmed by the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court reversed, citing two principles it considered uniquely relevant to witness testimony in the fruit of the
poisonous tree context. First, "the degree of free will exercised by
the witness is not irrelevant in determining the extent to which
the basic purpose of the exclusionary rule will be advanced by its
'
application.' "3
Second, the exclusion of the testimony "would
perpetually disable a witness from testifying about relevant and
material facts, regardless of how unrelated such testimony might
be to the purpose of the original illegal search or the evidence
discovered thereby."' ' The Court was thus led to the conclusion
that reliability, while not relevant to the exclusion of inanimate
evidence, was properly considered in regard to witness testimony.
On the basis of this analysis, the testimony was found to have
been improperly excluded.
229.

For earlier cases, see PRrruL RIUGHTs, supra note 1, § 71 at 432 nn.7

& 8.
230. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
231. Id.at 276.
The greater the willingness of the witness to freely testify, the greater
the likelihood that he or she will be discovered by legal means and,
concomitantly, the smaller the incentive to conduct an illegal search
to discover the witness. Witnesses are not like guns or documents which
remain hidden from view until one turns over a sofa or filing cabinet.

Witnesses can, and often do, come forward and offer evidence entirely
of their own volition.

Id.
232.

id. at 277.
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Right of Confrontation
Confession of Codefendant

In Bruton v. United States2 the Supreme Court held that
when defendants are jointly tried the right of confrontation may
be violated by the introduction into evidence of a confession that
implicates another defendant if the confessor does not take the
stand. The problem is sometimes avoided by removing all references to codefendants,"' but merely deleting names may be insufficient? 5 In Alexander v. State"' the name of the implicated
codefendant was replaced with the phrase "my friend." The court
of criminal appeals concluded that the reference was obviously to
the codefendant, particularly in light of the admission in the
codefendant's own confession that he had been in the company
of the confessor at the time in question.2 The court distinguished
Gwin v.State,m in which "blank" had been substituted for the
names of the other participants, because, it said, "there were
multiple co-defendants in Gwin, and not just two, as here, whose
identities were otherwise obvious to the jury. "' ' While the cases
may be legitimately distinguished, this reason is hardly the proper basis because nothing in the Gwin opinion suggests that the
number of defendants in the prosecution was critical to the result.
Rather, the court found that in addition to the redaction, the
other defendants had also confessed, and the jury had been instructed to consider each confession only against its maker. The
court concluded that either no error occurred, or, if any had occurred, it was harmless.4 " In Alexander, while the appellant also
233. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
234. See TAL F oHwrs, supra note 1, § 12 at 50 n.10.
235. See Randolph v. Parker, 575 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1978); Hodges v.
Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir. 1978); Kelley v. Rose, 346 F. Supp. 83 (E.D. Tenn.
1972).
236. 562 S.W.2d 207 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977), cert. denied, id. (Tenn.
1978).
237. Id. at 209. The court found the case comparable to White v. State,
497 S.W.2d 751 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1973), in which the
phrase "the other person" had been substituted. See 562 S.W.2d at 209.
238. 523 S.W.2d 636 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id.(Tenn. 1977).
239. Alexander v. State, 562 S.W.2d 207, 210 unnumbered footnote (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1977), all'd, id. (Tenn. 1978).
240. The harmless error rule was applied to Bruton violations in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
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confessed, "the substance of the two confessions was not the
same,"2" and instructions limiting the use of the confessions were
not given; both factors are adequate to distinguish Gwin.
Moreover, the multiple-codefendant distinction would appear inimical to the purpose of the Bruton rule. The "multiple codefendants" referred to by the court were in fact three in Gwin,
as opposed to two in Alexander. With the deletion of the specific
identifications, the jury was left with an ambiguous reference
that it might reasonably conclude applied to one of the two remaining defendants. Actual implication was replaced with speculative implication. If the juror or jurors speculated accurately, the
net result would be a violation of the Bruton rule. If the speculation was inaccurate, the result would be more offensive than a
Bruton error since the juror or jurors would thereby inculpate a
defendant when no inculpatory statement was actually made.
A Bruton error may be harmless, but, according to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Hodges v.Rose,W the test for the
harmlessness is not the strength of the prosecutor's case; rather,
the test is "whether the statement incriminates the defendant
against whom it is inadmissible in such a way as to create a
'substantial risk' that the jury will look to the statement in deciding on that defendant's guilt."4 3 In cases in which the name of
the cross-implicated defendant has been deleted, a consideration
of other evidence may be required to determine whether the referent of the confession is apparent, but this approach is quite different from weighing the strength of the prosecution's case independent of the confession. While such a rule is faithful to the Bruton
rule and sensitive to the persuasive impact of confessions, it
would appear at odds with the holding in Harrington v.
California,2" the first case in which the Supreme Court found a
Bruton error harmless. In Harringtonthe accused had been tried
with three codefendants, two of whom implicated the accused in
their confessions, which were introduced although neither confessor testified. The other codefendant, however, made a similar
confession and did testify, and the accused's own confession was
similar to that of the codefendants. The Court viewed the challenged confessions as cumulative evidence and concluded that
241. 562 S.W.2d at 209.
242, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir. 1978).
243. Id. at 647.
244. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
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that this

violation of Bruton was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." '
2. Laboratory Reports
In State v. Henderson"' the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the question whether a toxicology laboratory report could
be admitted in evidence through a witness other than the one who
performed the test. Defendant had been charged with the possession and sale of LSD. At the time of the trial the laboratory
assistants who conducted the identification tests were on vacation and unavailable to testify, and the court permitted the evidence to be admitted as an exhibit to the testimony of the director of the laboratory. The supreme court held that in the face of
an objection "the State can not prove an essential element of a
criminal offense by test results introduced through a witness
other than the one who conducted the tests"4 7 and quoted the
opinion of the court of criminal appeals at length. That court had
concluded that defendant had been denied the sixth amendment
right of confrontation.
D. Right to Counsel
While the representation of two or more codefendants by a
single attorney is not impermissible per se, 45 it may constitute a
denial of the sixth amendment right to counsel when the interests
of the clients are in conflict."' In Halloway v. Arkansas250 appointed counsel for three defendants charged with robbery and
rape moved well in advance of the scheduled date for trial that
separate counsel be appointed for each defendant because of the
possibility of a conflict of interest, and the motion was denied. On
the day of the trial the motion was renewed, counsel calling par245. Id. at 254.
246. 554 S.W.2d 117 (Tenn. 1977).
247. Id. at 122.
248. See, e.g., Moran v. State, 457 S.W.2d 886 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert.
denied, id. (Tenn. 1970).
249. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). Cf. Mattress v. State,
564 S.W.2d 678 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977) (assistant district attorney general had
previously been assigned, as staff attorney for legal clinic, to defend defendants
on different charges. Conflict of interests was sufficiently cured by barring the
assistant attorney general from prosecution of the instant case).
250. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
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ticular attention to the possibility that one or two of the defendants might testify and that this would place upon counsel the
impossible burden of eliciting favorable testimony from the witness while also cross-examining him in the interest of the codefendants. Although the conflict of interest became increasingly obvious and counsel called the matter to the attention of the court
repeatedly, the trial judge adamantly refused to appoint additional counsel. Defendants were convicted on all counts, and the
state supreme court affirmed.
In reversing the conviction, the United States Supreme
Court held that defendants had been denied the effective assistance of counsel when, notwithstanding the repeated requests of
counsel, the trial judge "failed either to appoint separate counsel
or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk was too
remote to warrant separate counsel."' Furthermore, the Court
held, once such a potential conflict is established, the defendant
is not required to prove actual prejudice. The Court found the
application of the harmless error rule in this context unmanageable," 2 and therefore reversal was mandatory.
E.

Identification

1. Witnesses
The Supreme Court in Manson v. Brathwaitem clarified the

due process requirement for precritical-stage identifications.
When the identification of a suspect, either corporeal-or photographic, occurs prior to a critical stage in the criminal proceedings, the right to presence of counsel does not apply,W but this
identification and any subsequent courtroom identification must
satisfy due process standards. 5
In Simmons v. United States2 " the Court had held that an
251. Id. at 484. Cf. United States v. Steele, 576 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1978)
(rejecting per se rule requiring a conflict of interest hearing in all cases of dual
representation).
252. 435 U.S. at 490-91.
253. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
254. The right to counsel attaches only to corporeal identifications conducted "at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
255. Id. at 690-91.
256. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
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in-court identification did not violate due process unless a prior
out-of-court idenfication was "so impermissibly suggestive as to
give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 7 The focus was on the reliability of the courtroom
identification in light of the "totality of circumstances" surrounding the witness's observations during the commission of
the crime."'
If the prosecution seeks to introduce evidence of the pretrial
identification, however, the issue is whether the confrontation
was "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification." ' ' In Stovall v.Denno2 0 the Court had
found no due process violation in an admittedly suggestive confrontation, ostensibly because the suggestiveness was not only
necessary but "imperative." '' Stovall, thus, implied a prophylactic rule requiring exclusion of evidence of identifications made
during an unnecessarily suggestive confrontationY
In Manson the Court rejected the apparent implication of
Stovall. Manson involved the admissibility of a precritical-stage
photographic identification that was concededly both suggestive
and unnecessary3" The Court acknowledged that some circuit
courts had determined such evidence to be inadmissible per se 2l
whereas others looked instead to the reliability of identifications
despite unnecessarily suggestive confrontation procedures.6 The
per se approach, however, was dismissed by the Court as unnecessary for deterring police misconduct and inconsistent with ensuring jury access to reliable evidence.2

6

Instead, the Court con-

cluded that "reliability is the linchpin in determining the admis257.
258,

Id. at 384.
Id. at 383.

259. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 302. In Stoval! the accused, a black, was brought handcuffed
by five white police officers and two white members of the prosecutor's staff to
the hospital room of the only witness to a murder. Id. at 295. The police reasonably feared that the witness might die before any less suggestive confrontation
could be arranged. Id. at 302 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir.

1966)).
262.

See 432 U.S. at 120 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

263.
264.
265.

Id. at 99.
Id. at 110.

Id.
266. Id. at 112-13.
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sibility of identification testimony."2 7
The Manson Court listed five factors to be considered in
assessing the reliability of the pretrial identification:"' (1) the
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the
crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the coincidence
of the description of the culprit given by the witness prior to the
identification and the actual appearance of the party identified;
(4) the level of certainty of the witness at the time of the identification; and (5) the amount of time between the crime and the
identification."' In Manson the identification fared well under
each factor: (1) the witness observed the offender for two to three
minutes, at a distance of two feet, with adequate lighting; (2) the
witness was a trained police officer; (3) the witness's detailed
description matched that of defendant; (4) the photographic
identification was unequivocal; and (5) the verbal description
was given within minutes of the crime, and the photographic
identification occurred two days later.270 Given these factors, the
Court saw no reason to exclude evidence of the pretrial identification, notwithstanding its suggestiveness. While presenting the
witness with an array of photographs including a number of individuals of similar appearance to the one selected would have been
preferable, "[tihe defect, if there be one, goes to weight and not
to substance.""'
Taken together, the holdings in Stovall and Manson apparently give prosecutors the best of both worlds. Under Stovall even
an unreliable identification from a suggestive confrontation is
admissible if the suggestiveness was necessary in view of the totality of the circumstances. 2 According to Manson an identification from an unnecessarily suggestive procedure is admissible if
the identification is deemed reliable under the totality of the
267. Id. at 114.
268. These factors were first articulated in Neil v. 3iggers, 409 U.S. 188,
199-200 (1972).
269. 432 U.S. at 114.
270. Id. at 114-16.
271. Id. at 117. "We are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment
of American juries, for evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is
customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot
measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature." Id. at 116.
272. 388 U.S. at 302.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

circumstances.273

At first blush Manson appeared not only to dilute due process protections but also to withdraw the sixth amendment protections extended in Gilbert v. California."'Gilbert and the companion case of United States v. Wade"I established that a postindictment lineup identification without the protection of the right
to presence of counsel was inadmissible per se. Although Manson
was a precritical-stage case, at no point did the Court limit its
holding to precritical-stage identifications. Rather, the Court
concluded broadly that the criteria set forth "are to be applied
in determining the admissibility of evidence offered by the prosecution concerning a post-Stovall identification.""' The more recent decision in Moore v. Illinois,"' however, demonstrates that
the Wade-Gilbert standard has not been abandoned.
In Moore the victim of rape had selected the picture of the
accused, along with one or two additional ones, from an array of
about ten photographs. A notebook found at the scene contained
a letter written by a woman with whom the accused was staying.
On the basis of this information, the accused was arrested and the
following morning taken for a preliminary hearing. The victim
was also taken to the hearing and told that she was going to view
a suspect whom she should identify if she could. She also signed
a complaint that named the accused as her assailant. At the
hearing the accused, unrepresented by counsel, was called to the
bench by name and charged with rape and deviant sexual behavior. The victim was then called to the bench and informed that
the police had evidence linking the accused to the crime. She
confirmed the identification. Evidence of this identification was
admitted at the trial of the accused, and he was convicted on all
counts.
The Supreme Court held first that the Wade-Gilbert standard was applicable to the identification even though the accused
had not been indicted at the time of the confrontationY' Wade
273. 432 U.S. at 114.
274. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
275. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
276. 432 U.S. at 117.
277. 434 U.S. 220 (1977).
278. "It is plain that '[t]he government ha[d] committed itself to prosecute,' and that petitioner found 'himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of
organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural
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and Gilbert were no less applicable because the identification was
a one-on-one confrontation rather than a lineup. ' Had the accused been represented by counsel, the Court noted, much of the
suggestiveness of the confrontation could have been avoided by,
for example, (1) postponing the hearing un il a lineup could be
arranged, (2) or excluding the victim from the courtroom during
the reading of the charges and seating the accused among the
spectators for the identification, and (3) permitting crossexamination of the victim to test the identification." In light of
the prohibition in Gilbert of the use of proof of an identification
at which the right to counsel had been improperly denied, the
conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a determination whether the admission of the evidence was harmless error .2
On the other hand, on remand the accused would have the opportunity to show that the in-court identification was itself the product of the improper identification at the preliminary hearing and
therefore should also have been excluded.n2 Very likely, the question of harmless error will turn on the success or failure of the
defense in urging the latter point.
2. Handwriting
Even when obtained involuntarily, samples of handwriting
may be secured for purposes of identification without violating
the fourth amendment, protection against unreasonable seizures
of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.'
This principle was subjected to a unique challenge in United
&2 1 in which the accused had refused to provide
States v.Waller
the police with a sample of his handwriting for comparison with
the handwriting on several checks that allegedly had been fraudulently signed. At trial, the prosecution offered in evidence a
fingerprint card bearing the signature of the accused, at which
point the accused left the courtroom, ostensibly to go to the restcriminal law.'" Id. at 228 (quoting from Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689
(1972)).
279. Id. at 229. "Indeed, a one-on-one confrontation generally is thought
to present greater risks of mistaken identification than a lineup." Id.
280. Id.at 230 n.5.
281. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
282. 434 U.S. at 332 n.7.
283. See TRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 56.
284. 581 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1978).
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room, but never returned. The trial nevertheless continued, during the course of which the prosecutor observed that the accused
had left on the table a yellow pad on which he had been taking
notes. The trial judge ordered the seizure of the pad, and subsequently an expert positively identified the handwriting as that
present on the checks. The accused was convicted in absentia 21
of eight counts of mail fraud and was apprehended a year later.
The accused contended, first, that the notes were a privileged
communication in which he had a legitimate expectation of privacy. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
found neither aspect of this argument compelling, observing that
the notes were not confidential communications between attorney and client, and that the action of the accused in leaving the
note pad prominently displayed in the courtroom was inconsistent with a claim of privacyM3 Second, the accused argued that
the trial court had abandoned its role as an impartial judge in
ordering the seizure. Here the appellate court responded that at
the time the seizure was ordered, the trial judge had no way of
knowing whether the handwriting sample would exonerate the
accused or establish his guilt." 7 The seizure had not occurred in
the presence of the jury, and apparently the court was doing no
more than attempting to determine the facts.
F.

Self-Incrimination

A fundamental right secured by the privilege against selfincrimination of the fifth amendment is the right of a defendant
in a criminal case not to take the stand. The failure of the defendant to testify is not to be considered evidence of guilt, and any
suggestion by the prosecutor or the trial judge to this effect is
itself a violation of the privilege." If the defendant requests an
instruction on the nature of the privilege, such an instruction
should be given. 2 1" The more difficult question, whether the trial
285. Where an accused voluntarily absents himself from his trial, the proceedings may continue, and the sixth amendment right of confrontation has not
been violated: See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
286.

From a fourth amendment perspective, the evidence had clearly been

abandoned, and therefore the court order might even be superfluous. See
PRETRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 48.
287. 581 F.2d at 587.
288. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). "It cuts down on the
privilege by making its assertion costly." Id. at 614.
289. See TRIAL 1IGHTS, supra note 1, § 64 at 255 n.98.
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court may instruct the jury on the nature of the privilege over the
objection of the defendant, 0 was considered by the Supreme
Court in Lakeside v. Oregon.' Defendant contended that the
privilege against self-incrimination was violated when the "trial
judge [drew] the jury's attention in any way to a defendant's
failure to testify unless the defendant acquiesce[d]." 12 The
Court disagreed, finding "strange indeed" the suggestion that the
privilege could be violated by an instruction "that the jury must
draw no adverse inferences of any kind from the defendant's exer'
cise of his privilege not to testify.1 1
G.

Confessions

1. Custodial Interrogation
The parameters of "custody" for Miranda purposes arose in
United States v. Lewis."' Defendant mail carrier was the second
endorsee on a state welfare check that was made payable to a
person who lived on the route defendant served. The payee had
reported the nonreceipt of the check, and suspicion quickly focused upon defendant. He was requested to report to the Postal
Inspector's Office and did so voluntarily. Although defendant was
given Miranda warnings, the court assumed an ineffective waiver
of those rights for purposes of addressing the issue raised.3 Nev6 and
ertheless, on the authority of Oregon v. Mathiason"
2
Beckwith v. United States, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Lewis concluded that defendant was not in custody since the
meeting was mutually arranged and defendant appeared voluntarily. The fact that the officials had taken the precaution of
290. For earlier decisions, see id. at 255 nn.99 & 1.
291, 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
292. Id. at 338.
293. Id. at 339 (emphasis in original). A second argument, that giving the
instruction over objection violated the sixth amendment right to counsel, was
found to fall of its own weight once it was determined that the instruction itself
was constitutionally permissible. "To hold otherwise would mean that the constitutional right to counsel would be implicated in almost every wholly permissible ruling of a trial judge, if it is made over the objection of the defendant's
lawyer." Id. at 341.
294. 556 F.2d 446 (6th Cir. 1977).
295. Id. at 449. Later in the opinion, the court found full compliance with
Miranda.
296. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
297. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
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giving Miranda warnings did not convert a noncustodial situation
into a custodial one.
In Trail v. State"' the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
held that "an officer may, in the course of an investigation of an
automobile accident, make inquiry of a person to determine if he
had been operating a vehicle involved in a collision without giving
the Miranda advice," ' and the response elicited will be admissible. Even though the officer had followed the accused to a hospital where the accused had received treatment and was asked by
the officer if he had been driving the car, the inquiry was still the
equivalent of an on-the-scene investigation9 and not a custodial
interrogation.
While this reasoning would have been sufficient to answer
defendant's argument, the court chose to respond to a theory not
advanced by defendant-that the requirement that a motorist
involved in an accident identify himself violates the privilege
against self-incrimination. The Trail court repudiated this theory
with California v. Byers,3' in which a similar California statute
had been sustained. Defendant in Trail, however, had not questioned the validity of the statute. Moreover, even though information may be required by the state without warnings, the conclusion does not follow that the same information can be demanded during custodial interrogation without warnings. By
comparison, the Supreme Court has held that warnings are not
constitutionally required prior to obtaining a consent to search,"
but at the same time the Court noted that a different result might
be reached if the accused were in custody at the time the consent
was sought." By correctly finding that defendant in Trail was not
in custody at the time of the inquiry, the court adequately disposed of the case; the comparison with Byers is both misleading
and unnecessary.
298.

552 S.W.2d 757 (Tenn.Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, id. (Tenn.

1977).

299. Id. at 758.
300. See State v.Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 456 S.W.2d 840 (1970); Braziel
v.State, 529 S.W.2d 501 (Tenn.Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn.1977).
301. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
302. Schneckloth v. Bustarnonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
303. Id. at 240 n.29.
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Waiver of Rights

Courts should be reluctant to find a waiver of the rights
secured by Miranda if the circumstances accompanying the giving of the rights manifest a design to discourage the assertion of
the rights.' In Maglio v. Jago s the accused was a sixteen-yearold runaway arrested on suspicion of murder. Upon receiving
Miranda warnings and being asked if he wished to waive them,
he responded, "Maybe I should have an attorney. ' " The officer
replied that the accused could not have an attorney at that time,
but would have to wait until the following day when one would
be appointed by the court. Although the accused was again in-

formed that he did not have to talk without a lawyer, questioning
continued, and ultimately an oral confession was obtained. Fortyfive minutes later, the prosecutor arrived to tape record a confession. The transcript of this exchange left little doubt that the
accused did not fully appreciate his right to the assistance of
appointed counsel prior to interrogation." Moreover, the transcript indicated that the accused saw no reason not to give the
second confession in light of the previous unrecorded one."N
304. See TRtu Riotrrs, supra note 1, 4 87 at 339 n.43.
305. 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978).
306. Id. at 203.
307. "Q. Okay, the next question is this. Do you understand further that if you want a lawyer but didn't feel that you could afford one,
that we would have to appoint one for you before you talked to us. Do
you understand that?"
"A. Before I did talk to you?"
"Q. Yea, do you understand that-duly appointed for you?"
"A. I understand it now. It's not the way it seemed before, but it
doesn't matter."
Id. at 203 (quoting trial court record).
308. "Q. Okay, I have just explained what your rights are, and
Dan I am going to ask you this, Dan at this time. Do you wish to go
ahead and tell us what you know about this death of Walter Lee Weyrick and talk to us now without a lawyer present?"
"A. Am I just supposed to start talking or?"
"Q. No, do you want to talk to us without a lawyer being present?"
"A. Yes. You two are lawyers anyway."
"Q. Yes, but I'm, do you want a lawyer yourself before you talk to
us? You have to say no, you can't just shake your head."
"A. Yea, I know, I forgot. It doesn't matter now."
"Q. In other words, you are willing at this point to go ahead and
tell Mr. Rodgers and myself about what happened out there without
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that the confession was improperly admitted into evidence.
The accused had initially expressed a desire to consult with an
attorney, and Miranda indicated that the interrogation should
cease at that point 00 Instead, the officer responded in a fashion
that would appear designed to discourage the use of the right.
Moreover, after indicating that counsel could not be obtained
until the following day, the officer resumed interrogation without
permitting the accused even to consider the options available to
him. The court concluded: "[A] suspect must not be forced to
constantly and vigorously assert his or her right to counsel in
order to counter a finding of waiver especially when the suspect
is only sixteen years old." 310 Even if the rights of the accused were
scrupulously honored in the second recorded statement, this confession was inadmissible as the fruit of the prior confession, and
the statements of the accused provided a classic instance for application of the "cat out of the bag" theory.3"
A similar question was raised in Lee v. State,321 in which the
accused was advised of his rights, waived them, and then asked
to call his attorney who was out of his office at that time. The
prosecution contended that the request to consult counsel was
made after the confession was given, but the appellate court
found no evidence in the record as to when the statements were
made. Under an interpretation most favorable to the prosecution,
the request to consult with counsel after the confession cast an
aura of suspicion on the purported prior waiver and placed a
heavy burden upon the prosecution to show that the waiver was
voluntarily and knowingly given. In the absence of a clear showing of waiver, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the evidence was improperly admitted.
H. Preliminary Hearing
The statutory right to a preliminary hearing'13 has been the
having your own lawyer here with you, is that correct?"
"A. Yea, it's the same story, it doesn't much matter."
Id. at 207 (quoting trial court record).
309. Id. at 205.
310. Id. at 206-07.
311. See United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947).
312. 560 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977), cert. denied, id. (Tenn.
1978).
313.

TENN. Coos ANN. § 40-1131 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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subject of constant legislative revision 1' and judicial scrutiny and
was recently examined by the court of criminal appeals in Nolan
v.State.3 5 Under the 1971 version of the statute," the right to a
preliminary hearing ceased once an indictment had been returned, and in any event the hearing was conditioned upon the
request of the accused.3 17 The 1974 amendment ' to the statute
extended the right to a preliminary hearing to those arrested
without a warrant who were already entitled to a hearing under
a separate statute1 ' and to those arrested with a warrant who had
requested a preliminary hearing. In either event the indictment
could be abated if no hearing was held, provided the motion for
abatement was made within thirty days of the arrest.3'1 The requirement that the accused request a preliminary hearing was
eliminated by the 1976 amendment 2 ' to the statute. A party indicted without being arrested prior thereto, however, is not entitled to a preliminary hearing under the statute. 2
In Nolan the accused was arrested with a warrant, was not
granted a preliminary hearing prior to indictment, and was denied a motion to abate the indictment. The appellate court indicated that the statutory right to a preliminary hearing obviously
had been denied,323 but the question remained whether the denial
could be dismissed as harmless error.324 If the only legitimate
purposes served by a preliminary hearing were to determine probable cause and to fix bail, then apparently the error always would
be harmless once an indictment has been returned. Since, at least
in theory, the indictment requires more rigorous proof of probability of guilt than that required to establish probable cause at a
preliminary hearing, the failure to satisfy formally the lesser stan314.
315.
316.
317.
1, at 268.
318,
319.
320.

For a thorough analysis, see Comment, 43 TENN. L. REV. 635 (1976).
568 S.W.2d 637 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert denied, id. (Tenn. 1978).
1971 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 245, § 2.
This aspect of the statute was criticized in 1971 Survey, supra note
1974 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 701, § 1.
TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 40-604 (1975).

For criticism of the thirty-day limitation, see 43

TENN.

L. REV. at 644-

45.

321. 1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 760, § 1.
322. Waugh v. State, 564 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. 1978); Vaughn v. State, 557
S.W.2d 64 (Tenn. 1977).
323. 568 S.W.2d at 839.
324. Id.
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dard is analytically insignificant. As to the fixing of bail, the
denial of bail (if such was the case) may or may not be harmful
error, but if it is, the error is in the denial of bail, not in the denial
of a preliminary hearing. The denial of pretrial release is a question of constitutional dimension" irrespective of whether there
has been a preliminary hearing or indictment. If the question
arises following conviction on appeal, the accused must show that
the denial of pretrial release adversely affected the fairness and
possibly the outcome of the trial.'"
The legislature, however, intended more when it amended
the statute to permit abatement of the indictment: "IThe Legislature was aware that preliminary hearings were sometimes
useful to a defendant for discovering of the State's case, including material for possible impeachment of witnesses at trial." 3"
The appellate court saw its responsibility to review the trial
record to determine whether "the denial of discovery of at least
the prima facie portion of the State's case necessary to establish
probable cause upon a preliminary hearing amounted to reversible error." 3 To this end, the court focused upon the crossexamination of prosecution witnesses and concluded, in effect,
that defense counsel did a good job. "It does not affirmatively
appear that the error affected the result upon the trial. '"3
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Daughtrey contended that the
denial of a preliminary hearing violated due process" and was
prejudicial per se, but even if this were not true, the case must
nevertheless be remanded for a determination whether the error
was harmless. While the reasoning of the majority on this issue
is vulnerable to criticism, Judge Daughtrey's first argument appears to say too much and her second argument says too little.
The due process argument is as follows: While the right to a
preliminary hearing is only a statutory right, the United States
325.
326.

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; TENN. CoNSr. art. 1, §§ 15 & 16.

Cf. Justice Douglas, as Circuit Justice, in Bandy v. United States,

81 S. Ct. 197, 198, vacated and remanded, 364 U.S. 477 (1960) (denial of release
on personal recognizance pending appeal from conviction could interfere with
effective appeal by preventing defendant's investigation of case and consultation with counsel).

327. 568 S.W.2d at 839.
328. Id,
329. Id.
330. Apparently under the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution, although the basis of the due process right is never made ex-

plicit.
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Supreme Court held in Coleman v. Alabama33 ' that a statutorily
created preliminary hearing is a "critical stage" for purposes of
the right to counsel. From this, the conclusion is drawn,
If we acknowledge the preliminary hearing to be a "critical
stage" of the proceedings, I do not understand how the deprivation of one's right to a preliminary hearing can ever be viewed
as "harmless error." Indeed, it seems clear to me that failure to
provide the defendant with a hearing at a critical stage of the
proceedings is a violation of due process so serious as to constitute prejudice per se.?
The conclusion, however, does not follow from the premise. First,
the argument is circular because it concludes that an accused is
entitled to a hearing at a "critical stage," when the hearing itself
is the critical stage. Second, and more fundamentally, the labeling of an event as a "critical stage" in the criminal proceedings
does not mean that the accused is therefore entitled to this
"stage" as a matter of constitutional right. The Supreme Court
has held, for example, that a postindictment lineup is a "critical
stage" in the proceedingsn but has never held that an accused
therefore has a right to participate in a lineup to test the identification capability of witnesses. Many lower courts have held
that no such right exists m
The dissent cited seven decisions from other jurisdictions in
support of the conclusion reached. In cases from California' 5 and
South Carolina" the courts treated the failure to hold a preliminary hearing as fatal to the jurisdiction of the trial court." The
California court cited no authority, statutory or otherwise, for its
conclusion. The South Carolina court applied a statute3" that
was only applicable when a magistrate issued an arrest warrant
331. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
332. 568 S.W.2d at 841 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
333. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
334. See TRIAL PGHTS, supra note 1, § 52 at 195 n.48. The only case to
the contrary appears to be Evans v. Superior Ct., 11 Cal. 3d 617, 522 P.2d 681,
114 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1974).
335. People v. Bomar, 73 Cal. App. 372, 238 P. 758 (1925).
336. State v. Wheeler, 259 S.C. 571, 193 S.E.2d 515 (1972).
337. In the dissenting opinion two other decisions to the opposite effect are
noted, Cline v. Smith, 229 Ga. 190, 190 S.E.2d 51 (1972); Douglas v. Maxwell,
175 Ohio St. 317, 194 N.E.2d 576 (1963). See 568 S.W.2d at 841 n.3 (Daughtrey,
J., dissenting).
338. S.C. CODE § 22-5-30 (1976).
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for a crime committed outside the jurisdiction of the magistrate.
The South Carolina court concluded that, "the court of general
sessions [is] not to acquire jurisdiction until after such preliminary hearing."' ' 9 The Tennessee statute contains no such language, and the prior interpretations of the statute in its varied
forms indicate that the statute is not jurisdictional in nature. The
dissent in Nolan suggests nothing to the contrary.
A second group of four cases cited by the dissent described
the statutory right to a preliminary hearing as "fundamental,"" '
"substantial,"3 ' or "valuable.113 2 In at least three of the four
cases, the judicial attitude may be attributed to the mandatory
language employed in the statute' 3 Primary reliance is placed on
Manor v. State,31"in which the indictment and conviction of the
accused were set aside by the Georgia Supreme Court for want
of a preliminary hearing. The sweeping implication of Manor was
substantially deflated in Cannon v. Grimes,* however, which
emphasized the fact that Manor involved "a coerced waiver of
a commitment hearing prior to indictment." 3' In Cannon, the
Georgia Supreme Court held that no preliminary hearing is re339. Id.
340. State v. Howland, 153 Kan. 352, 363, 110 P.2d 801, 808 (1941); Davis
v. State, 121 Neb. 399, 402, 237 N.W. 297, 298 (1931).
341. State v. Howland, 153 Kan. at 363, 110 P.2d at 808; State v. Trow,
49 S.D. 485, 487, 207 N.W. 466, 466 (1926).
342. Manor v. State, 221 Ga. 866, 868, 148 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1966).
343. GA. CoDE ANN. § 27-210 (1978): "Every officer arresting under a warrant shall exercise reasonable diligence in bringing the person arrested before
the person authorized to examine, commit or receive bail and in any event to
present the person arrested before a committing officer within 72 hours after
arrest . . . ' KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-610 (1964) (current version at KN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-2901 (1974)): "Every person arrested by warrant for any offense...
-

shall be brought before some magistrate for the same county ...

;" S.D. Com-

§ 23-20-2 (1967) (repealed by 1978 S.D. Sesa. Laws ch. 178, §
577 effective July 1, 1979): "No information shall be filed against any person
for any offense until such person shall have had a preliminary examination
" No statute is cited in the Nebraska case. The pertinent provisions
.
would appear to be NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 29-412 (1975): "It shall be the duty of
the officer making the arrest to take the person so arrested before the proper
PILm LAWS ANN.

magistrate.

. . " and id. § 29-504: "When the complaint is for a felony, upon

the accused being brought before the magistrate, he shall proceed as soon as
may be, in the presence of the accused, to inquire into the complaint."
344. 221 Ga. 866, 148 S.E.2d 305 (1966).
345. 223 Ga. 35, 153 S.E.2d 445 (1967).
346. Id. at 35-36, 153 S.E.2d at 446.
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quired when the accused is indicted before incarceration "or after
arrest but while, in the present case, he is undergoing medical
treatment in a hospital until after indictment." '47 Moreover, as
the dissent acknowledges, in none of the four cases do the courts
resort to constitutional invocations in reaching their decisions.
Finally, a case is cited4 in which the Arizona Supreme Court
concluded that "[djue process of law requires that an accused
must be given a full hearing meeting the requirements of due
process." 34' The court was applying a state constitutional provision, however, which stated unequivocally that "no person shall
be prosecuted for felony by information without having had a
preliminary examination before a magistrate or having waived
such preliminary examination."3"
If the Nolan dissent is correct "that the denial of a preliminary hearing violates due process and is prejudicial per se,'
then the Tennessee statute is unconstitutional in not guaranteeing a right to a preliminary hearing in all cases, including those
in which indictment is obtained prior to arrest. None of the cases
cited will support such a conclusion. The dissent, however, is not
unwarranted in its dissatisfaction with the majority's conclusion
that the error was harmless. As Judge Daughtrey observes,
"[w]hat we cannot tell from the trial transcript is how much
better prepared the defense attorney might have been had he
been given the benefit of learning 'the precise details of the prosecution's case' in advance of trial."3" Moreover, a remand for a
consideration of the possibilty of prejudice would not appear adequate. One of the principal reasons the Supreme Court in Gideon
v.Wainwright made the right to counsel mandatory in all felony cases was the judicial frustration resulting from attempts to
second-guess how the presence of counsel might have changed the
outcome in any case. Admittedly, the potential for prejudice in
the present case is not so great as that entailed in the complete
absence of counsel at trial, but when the statutory mandate is
clear and calls for no sophisticated exercise of judgment by the
347.
348.
349.

Id. at 36, 153 S.E.2d at 446.
State v. Essman, 98 Ariz. 228, 403 P.2d 540 (1965).
Id. at 232, 403 P.2d at 543.

350. Anz. CoNsr. art. 2, § 30.
351.
352.
353.

568 S.W.2d at 840-41 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
Id. at 843 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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trial court, judicial economy would suggest automatic reversal
when, as in the present case, an abatement of the indictment is
sought prior to trial and is denied. Such a solution is not an
attractive one in a case such as Nolan, which concerned a homicide conviction in which the appellate court failed to perceive any
likelihood of prejudice. By addressing the issue of harmless error,
however, the court discourages strict adherence to the statute by
trial courts and assumes the burden of evaluating the record in
each case. As the dissent in Nolan pointed out, the conclusion
reached will frequently be highly speculative.
I. Indictment by Grand Jury
An indictment may be held constitutionally void if racial
discrimination occurred in the selection of the grand jury,"' The
presence of some blacks on grand juries does not foreclose a find 7
ing of discrimination, nor does an absence of any blacks compel
such a finding. 55 The critical question is whether invidious discrimination was present in the creation of the pool from which
grand jurors were selected.' Nevertheless, a prima facie case of
discrimination may be established through the use of statistical
patterns.'- The burden then shifts to the state to rebut this showing.'" In Mitchell v. Rose3 ' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit found the statistics regarding the participation of blacks on grand juries too fragmentary to prove or disprove
354. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
355. Mitchell v. Rose, 570 F.2d 129, 133 (6th Cir. 1978).
356. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945).
357. See TRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 119.
358. Once the burden has shifted to the state, it may rebut the
prima facie case in several ways. The state may impose any reasonable
qualifications it wishes on its grand jurors; for instance, it may require
that they be literate, that they not be convicted felons, or that they be
registered voters. The neutral imposition of any of these requirements
may possibly result in the exclusion of more members of one race than
another . . . .The state must present some concrete evidence of the
effect of its neutral requirements, not merely present to the court unfounded suppositions about the literacy, intelligence and good character of its black citizens. Finally, it should be noted that self-serving
protestations from the officials involved that racial considerations
played no part in the selection are not enough to rebut a prima facie
case.

570 F.2d at 134 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
359. 570 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1978).
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discrimination but held that petitioner was entitled to relief upon
the sufficiently clear showing of discrimination in the selection of
grand jury foremen. Not only was there no evidence that a black
had ever served as foreman, but a trial judge conceded that he
"never really gave any thought to appointing a black foreman." 3'
The court held that this was evidence analagous to the concession
in Norris v.Alabama"' that the jury commissioners had "never
discussed" the inclusion of blacks in the venire, which led to a
judicial finding of discrimination-"' The court was unimpressed
by the state's contention that petitioner'was in any event unprejudiced because the foreman did not vote on the indictment. Just
as no need existed to show prejudice when the grand jury was
improperly selected,m the court saw no reason to reach a different
result when the foreman Was improperly selected. The court
noted that by statute the foreman had "equal power and authority in all matters coming before the grand jury with the other
members thereof,""' and that his or her duties -included
"assisting the district attorney in ferreting out crime," 3 subpoenaing witnesses, administering oaths," and endorsing indictments,W all of which afforded opportunities for the influence of
prejudice?" Moreover, acknowledging that any foreman, however
selected, could be motivated by prejudice, the court observed
that the integrity of the judicial process is a separate interest
served by the absence of discrimination.36 '
360. Id. at 131:
361. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
362. "Officials who select grand jurors have a duty to learn who is qualified to fill the position of grand juror, and to consider qualified individuals from
all segments of society. Failure to perform that duty, resulting in the exclusion
of a qualified segment of society, is unconstitutional discrimination." 570 F.2d
135.
363. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
364. TriN. CODE A;. 9 40-1506 (1975).
365. Id. § 40-1510.
366. Id. §§40-1510, -1622.
367. Id. * 40-1706.
368. It seems clear that the potential for prejudice, given the
position of authority and influence the foreman or forewoman holds, is

considerable, and in such cases where the fact of prejudice 'hay be
impossible to prove, yet its effect could be so insidious and farreaching, the courts have refused to require proof of prejudice before
granting relief.

570 F.2d at 136.
369. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 498 (1972); Ballard v. United States,
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Trial by Jury

1. Applicabilty of Right
The circumstances under which the right to trial by jury
applies were addressed in United States v. Stewart.""Defendants
had been convicted of what the court characterized as simple
battery,"' an offense carrying a maximum punishment of a $500
fine and six months imprisonment. The Supreme Court had held
in Baldwin v. New York"' that an offense calling for punishment
in excess of six months was serious, and therefore the right to trial
by jury was applicable. In Stewart the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Baldwin did not require
a finding that an offense carrying a maximum penalty of six
months was serious. Indeed, Congress had classified such offenses as petty. 3 While the court viewed the potential penalty
as the "most relevant" consideration, it was not the exclusive
one. The court noted that the simple battery was characterized
by Blackstone as "the first and lowest stage" of violence 74 and
concluded that "the offense is not in common understanding a
serious one" 37 that mandated trial by jury.
2.

Number of Jurors

In 1970, the Supreme Court held in Williams v. Florida"'
that the sixth amendment right to trial by jury could be satisfied
with a jury composed of less than twelve members, in that in' In Ballew v. Georgia ' the Court held that the line
stance six. 77
329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) ("The injury is not limited to the defendant-there is
injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large,
and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.").
370. 568 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1978).
371. 18 U.S.C. § 113(d) (1976).
372. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
373. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
374. It encompasses the kind of conduct which is common enough
in daily life, although universally disapproved. Society's knowledge of
a person's conviction of simple assault and battery carries with it perhaps the inference that the defendant was quarrelsome or ill-tempered,
but without more does not usually attribute to him any more serious
or lasting opprobrium.
568 F.2d at 505.
375. Id.
376. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
377. The Court took note that under the procedure challenged the require-
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was drawn at six and that a conviction by a unanimous verdict
of a five-member jury deprived the accused of the right to trial
by jury. Taking advantage of the reservation in Williams that
"the number should probably be large enough to promote group
deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation, and to
provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative crosssection of the community,""' the principal opinion, signed by
only two Justices,3" relied upon "recent empirical data"' " that
raised "substantial doubt about the reliability and appropriate
representation of panels smaller than six." ' 2
3. Juror Bias
A potential juror may be disqualified to serve if his or her
relationship to the prosecuting attorney would tend to bias the
juror's viewpoint.'" In Clariday v. State" ' defense counsel discovered, subsequent to conviction, that the jury foreman had been a
part-time law student enrolled in a class taught by the district
attorney general for the county in which the trial occurred. The
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals found that the voir dire for
defendant had been perfunctory, and that the particular juror
was not shown to have answered any questions falsely or withheld
any requested information. Nevertheless, defendant contended
that the undisclosed teacher-student relationship was a per se
disqualification under the authority of Toombs v.State,"" in
which the first cousin of the prosecuting witness' wife was found
ment of unanimous verdict had been retained. Cf.Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (both sustaining less than
unanimous verdicts by twelve-member juries).
378. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
379. 399 U.S. at 100.
380. Justice Blackmun was joined by Justice Stevens, 435 U.S. at 224.
Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, however, concurred in the opinion but
opposed the granting of a new trial, because they considered the obscenity
statute under which the accused was tried unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at
246.
381. Id. at 232.
382. Id. at 239. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and
Rehnquist concurred in the judgment.
383. See TRIAL RiGrs, supra note 1, § 116.
384. 552 S.W.2d 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, id. (Tenn.
1977).
385. 197 Tenn. 229, 270 S.W.2d 649 (1954).
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under an obligation to divulge this fact when asked if he knew any
reason why he could not give the parties a fair trial. There, however, the court had found a "very close kinship.

. .

together with

the friendly relations and associations existing between the two
families." ' " The Clariday court found the circumstances clearly
distinguishable and declined to extend Toombs to these facts. 7
4.

Deliberations

In the course of deliberations on a second degree murder
charge, the jury in Leach v.StateW requested and received supplemental instructions regarding defendant's eligibility for a parole should they convict for a lesser included offense and impose
a three year sentence. Thereafter, they returned a verdict of
guilty of second degree murder with a sentence of from ten to
twenty years in the penitentiary. Defendant contended that once
the jury undertook consideration of the lesser included offense, it
could not return to a deliberation on the greater offense without
violating the right to protection against double jeopardy.
Avoiding what was undoubtedly a bogus double jeopardy
claim,S the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals turned instead
to Farris v. State,3" which had held a statute3 ' mandating instructions on parole eligibility unconstitutional.' 2 Interpreting

that decision as mandating reversal when "the charge on the
parole statutes brought about the verdict,"" the court had no
difficulty in surmising that such charge was a factor in the verdict
inLeach.
Moreover, the challenged instruction was not included in the
trial court's original instruction. While acknowledging that subsequent instructions are not improper, the court suggested that
"the better practice [would be] to admonish the jury not to place
386.

Id. at 233, 270 S.W.2d at 651.

387. See also Sears v.Lewis, 49 Tenn. App. 631, 357 S.W.2d 839 (1961),
cert. denied, id.(Tenn. 1962).
388. 552 S.W.2d 407 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id.(Tenn. 1977).
389. The fact that jurors repeatedly consider different charges against an
accused in whatever order they choose is obviously their prerogative. Leach

differs only in that counsel had gotten a glimpse of what was going on in the
jury room.
390.
391.
392.
393.

535 S.W.2d 608 (Tenn. 1976).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2707 (1975).
See 1976-1977 Survey, supra note 1, at 49-50.
552 S.W.2d at 408.
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undue emphasis on the supplemental instructions and to consider
them in conjunction with the entire charge." ' The failure to so
admonish could be, and in this case was, reversible error..31.

The Farrisissue also influenced a reversal by the Tennessee
Supreme Court in Sampson v. State9 in which the length of the
sentence was indirectly argued through the contention that if
defendant were found not guilty by reason of insanity he would
be "back on the streets." 397
A novel issue relating to jury deliberations arose in Rushing
v. State,"' in which, after deliberations in the accused's rape trial
had begun, the trial judge permitted the jurors to separate and
return to their homes for the night. Although the parties had
agreed at the commencement of the trial that the jury would be
permitted to separate, the accused contended on appeal that the
agreement was inapplicable once deliberations had begun. The
controlling statute provided that upon agreement of the parties,
the court "may permit jurors to separate at times when they are
not duly engaged in the trial or deliberations of the case." 3 "1In
an explanation worthy of Lewis Carroll, the court held that the
jurors were not engaged in deliberations once the trial judge permitted them to separate, and deliberations only resumed when
the jury reconvened'"' Under this reading of the statute, circumstances are difficult to imagine in which the trial judge would
have committed error in permitting the jurors to go home if the
parties have given their prior consent. The procedure could only
be attacked if any of the jurors, having been so released, contin394. Id. at 409.
395. The court's conclusion was buttressed by a post-trial interview with
one of the jurors.
396. 553 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn. 1977).
397. Id. at 350. Since the instruction on insanity was found improper for
independent reasons, see text accompanying notes 128-29 supra, the Farrisaspect may be of little significance.
398. 565 S.W.2d 893 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977), cert. denied, id. (Tenn.
1978).
399. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2528 (1975) (current version in Cum. Supp.
1978).
400. When the trial judge adjourns court and allows the jury to
separate, deliberation within the meaning of T.C.A. § 40-2528 ceases,
and does not resume until the jurors are reassembled in the proper
setting and context of the trial process. We, therefore, hold that the
jury was not allowed to separate while deliberating ....
565 S.W.2d at 895-96.
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ued their deliberations outside the institutional setting. In
Rushing the trial judge had determined the following morning
that none of the jurors had been approached by anyone. The court
of criminal appeals held that at a minimum the accused would
have to show some prejudice. Evidence indicated that some of the
jurors had conversed as they left the courtroom, but the appellate
court was satisfied with the absence of any evidence that the case
40
had been discussed. '

As a corollary of the principal contention, the accused argued
that by permitting the jurors to go home the court had deprived
him of the prospect of having a hung jury. The defense suggested
that "noises from the jury room" indicated that the jurors were
unable to agree, and that ultimate agreement was only possible
because of the interruption and the extended rest period. 02 Without dismissing the argument as unmeritorious in theory, the appellate court found the prospect of a hung jury unsupported by
the record since the jury foreman had requested that they3 be
40
allowed to resume their deliberations on the following day.
K.

Fair Trial

1. Presumption of Innocence
In Taylor v.Kentucky °' the accused was tried for robbery,
and the trial court, while instructing the jury on the prosecution's
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, refused instructions requested by defendant on the presumption of innocence and the indictment's lack of evidentiary value. The Supreme Court noted that while "the presumption of innocence and
the prosecution's burden of proof are logically similar, the ordinary citizen may well draw significant additional guidance from
an instruction on the presumption of innocence."'05 While conceding that an instruction including the phrase "presumption of
innocence" was not mandated by the due process clause of the
401. A claim that one juror had spoken to the prosecutor was not supported by the record. Id. at 896.
402. Id. Cf. Hembree v. State, 546 S.W.2d 235 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976)
(a reversal was obtained, probably because of jury fatigue) (discussed in 19761977 Survey, supra note 1, at 44).
403. 565 S.W.2d at 896.

404. 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
405.

Id. at 484.
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fourteenth amendment, it was "one means of protecting the accused's constitutional right to be judged solely on the basis of
proof adduced at trial."4m The Court noted that the relatively
curt instructions placed little emphasis on the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and did not address the duty to
consider only evidence presented in the course of the trial. The
significance of these omissions was compounded by the prosecutor's arguments to the jury, which suggested guilt by association
and alluded to the arrest and indictment of defendant as evidence
of his guilt. Without extending its holding beyond the facts of the
case, the Court concluded that the failure to give the requested
instruction on the presumption of innocence denied defendant a
fair trial as guaranteed by the due process clause. 07
2. Discovery
While a request to order the prosecutrix in a sexual assault
case to undergo a psychiatric examination may not receive judicial sympathy,'" different questions were raised in State v.
Brown,0 0 in which the accused sought discovery of the medical
records of the prosecutrix while she was a patient in a state mental hospital. The prosecution contended that the communications
between psychiatrist and patient were privileged by statute, "
and none of the exceptions to the privilege were applicable in this
case. The court noted, however, that such communications were
not privileged when sought in a criminal case in which "the mental condition of the patient is an issue." '' The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that, "[c]learly, the mental condition of
the prosecuting victim was an issue," ' which indicated that the
supreme court apparently thought the case against the accused
was weak, and the credibility of the victim was material. Several
facts from the record were cited as significant: (1) the conviction
rested solely on the testimony of the victim and her twelve-year406. Id. at 486.
407. By implication the Court saw no need for a separate instruction respecting the lack of evidentiary value in the indictment.
408. See text accompanying notes 18-24 supra,
409. 552 S.W.2d 383 (Tenn. 1977).
410. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-112 (Cum.Supp. 1978).
411. 552 SW.2d at 385 (quoting TNi. CODE ANN. § 24-112 (Cum. Supp.
1978)),
412. Id. at 385.
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old grandson; (2) although the victim claimed to have bitten
defendant on the hand "real hard," no evidence of this bite was
observed at the time of the arrest; (3) both witnesses testified that
defendant had been shot in his face, among other places, repeatedly with a BB gun, but no evidence of this was observed at the
time of the arrest; (4) defendant put forward a strong alibi defense; and (5) the jury had been "hung" prior to receiving a
supplemental charge from the court.
Having determined that the communications were therefore
not privileged, the court turned to the question whether the communications were discoverable. A state statute permits discovery
by the defendant of documents "obtained from others which are
in possession of, or under the control of the attorney for the
state." 13 While the documents in question do not appear to be of
the sort contemplated by the statute, the court achieved the essential logical leap by holding that "the District Attorney General
represents 'the State' and [the hospital] is a 'State' mental
health facility.""' The court concluded that the records should be
given an in camera examination by the trial court and divulged
to defendant if they are found to have probative value for the
preparation of the defense.
L. Guilty Pleas
1.

Standard for Acceptance

In State v. Mackey'" the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in the
exercise of its supervisory power over the state courts, articulated
standards for the acceptance of guilty pleas, which it acknowledged went beyond the constitutional minimum mAndated by the
United States Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama.'' First,
prior to the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the judge must address
the defendant personally in open court and inform him of, as well
as determine that he understands, the following: (1) the nature
of the charge, the minimum and maximum punishment possible,
and the applicability of any punishment enhancement provisions; (2) the right to be represented by counsel, appointed or
retained, at every stage of the proceedings; (3) the right to plead
413.
414.
415.
416.

TNN. CODE ANN. § 40-2044 (1975).
552 S.W.2d at 385.
553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977).
395 U.S. 238 (1969).
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not guilty, to be tried by jury, and at the trial to have the assistance of counsel, the right of confrontation, and the right not to
testify; (4) in the event thedefendant pleads guilty, no further
trial will result, other than proceedings for the determination of
sentence; (5) in the event the defendant pleads guilty, he may be
asked questions regarding the offense by the judge or prosecutor,
and, if answers are given under oath in the presence of counsel,
they may be thereafter used in prosecution for perjury, and further, any prior convictions may be considered in the determination of sentence.
Second, "[tihe court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first, by addressing the defendant in open court, determining
that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or
of promises apart from a plea agreement.""' Additionally, the
court is to determine whether the willingness of the defendant to
plead guilty is the result of prior discussions with the prosecution.
Third, the court must determine that a factual basis underlies the plea.""
Fourth, a verbatim record of the proceedings is to be made
including: the judge's admonitions to the defendant; the inquiry
on the issue of voluntariness, including any plea agreement; the
defendant's understanding of the consequences of the plea; and
the inquiry as to the accuracy of the plea.
2. Plea Bargaining
In a series of decisions decided under either the double jeopardy clause or closely related notions of due process, the Supreme
Court has affixed constitutional limitations to the imposition of
punishment where an earlier determination has been aborted. In
North Carolinav.Pearce"'the Court held that an accused cannot
receive a more severe punishment following conviction on retrial
than he received following conviction at the previous trial, unless
the record cited new evidence that would justify harsher treatment by the sentencing court. ' " The same principle led to the
417. 553 S.W.2d at 341.
418. See Farmer v. State, 570 S.W.2d 359 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id.(Tenn. 1978).
419. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
420. "[Vlindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a
new trial." Id. at 725.
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42 ' that an accused could not be
conclusion in Blackledge v. Perry
indicted on a felony charge following a reversal of a misdemeanor
conviction based on the same facts.

In Bordenkircher v. Hayes12 the Court was called upon to

determine whether this constitutional inhibition of prosecutorial
vindictiveness was equally applicable to events occurring in the
course of plea negotiations. The accused was indicted for uttering
a forged instrument, an offense punishable by from two to ten
years in prison. In the course of plea bargaining the prosecution
offered to recommend a sentence of five years if the accused
would plead guilty to the indictment. If, however, he refused to
plead guilty, then the prosecution would seek a further indictment under the habitual criminal act, which, upon conviction,
would result in a mandatory life sentence. The accused refused
to plead guilty, was indicted under the habitual criminal statute,
and was found guilty on both counts.
In sustaining the denial of the writ of habeas corpus by the
federal district court,'2 the Supreme Court noted initially that
even though the habitual criminal charge had not been obtained
until after the negotiations, the intention of the prosecutor was
at all times clear. Analytically, the Court saw no difference between this case and one in which the recidivist charge had been
obtained at the outset and the prosecution then offered to drop
it in exchange for a plea of guilty. If no suggestion of a recidivist
charge had been made during the course of the negotiations, and
when the accused had refused to plead guilty the prosecution
without notice had sought and had obtained the additional count,
the Court suggested it might view the case differently.
In Bordenkircher, however, the matter complained of was no
more than the inevitable give and take of plea bargaining: "[Bly
tolerating and encouraging the negotiations of pleas, this Court
has necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple
reality that the prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table is to
persuade the defendant to forego his right to plead not guilty. 424
Whether a prosecutor has acted vindictively, or even what that
421. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
422. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
423. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had reversed. See Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
424. 434 U.S. at 364.
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term means in a constitutional sense is difficult to determine.
Pearce and Black ledge avoided that question by assuming vindictiveness until shown otherwise.
To assume that the prosecutor was not vindictive in
Bordenkircher may be unconvincing. Pearce is distinguishable in
that the feared partiality is on the part of the judiciary rather
than on the part of a party to the case. Blackledge, however, is
not so distinguishable; there, the ante was raised after conviction
and successful appeal, here, after a refusal to plead guilty. The
ultimate explanation for the Bordenkircher decision may be in
the Court's recognition that, except for a blatant case of vindictiveness, the phenomenon is uncontrollable. Had the Court held
the added count invalid in this case, in the future prosecutors
would simply gang all conceivable charges against the accused
prior to initiating negotiations. Proof of vindictiveness would be
virtually impossible so long as the prosecution offered only reductions in the charges or recommended sentences. Such a result
would be antithetical to the preference for candor and "could only
invite unhealthy subterfuge that would drive the practice of plea
bargaining back into the shadows from which it has so recently
emerged."121

M. Punishment
1. Determination of Sentence
The issue of the admissibility into evidence of prior convictions of the accused following a plea of guilty was addressed in
State v. Mackey."' In holding such evidence properly admitted,
the Tennessee Supreme Court went beyond the facts of the case
before it and established guidelines for hearings to determine
sentencing following a plea of guilty. Any matter relevant to sentencing may be presented by the defendant or by the prosecution,
including, but not limited to (1) matters of fact concerning the
offense; (2) the prior criminal record of the defendant, as well as
evidence of reputation and character; (3) the educational background of the defendant; (4) the employment background of the
defendant, including military record and present employment
status and capabilities; (5) the social history of the defendant,
including family relationships, interests and religion; (6) the
425.
426.

Id. at 365.
553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977).
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medical history of the defendant, with any psychological or psychiatric reports available to both sides; and (7) reports from any
social agencies with which the defendant has been involved.',
2. Consecutive Sentences
While trial judges have the statutory power to impose consecutive sentences,"" in Gray v. State'' the Tennessee Supreme
Court held that the record should include some reasons for such
a judgment.' 3 In Wiley v. State,"'' however, the court of criminal
appeals held that this rule would not apply to sentences imposed
prior to the Gray decision, particularly in light of the fact that
the record clearly showed that defendant was a dangerous offender - one of the categories that would warrant the imposition
of consecutive sentences as defined in Gray. Consecutive sentences for forgery and uttering a forged instrument that arose in
a single transaction3 2 were approved by the court of criminal
appeals in Anderson v. StatedU in light of the fact that defendant
was both a persistent and a multiple offender in the terminology
34

of Gray.'

Whether Gray, in delineating five categories of offenders eligible for consecutive sentences, intended its list to be exclusive
arose as an issue in Bethany v. State.43 The accused, a scoutmaster, was convicted on six charges of crime against nature
perpetrated against young boys in his charge. While recognizing
that the facts of the case did not fall squarely within any of the
Gray categories, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that a precise definition of every possible factual situation
had not been intended. The dissenting judge took the language
427. Id. at 344.
428. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2711 (1975).
429. 538 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. 1976).
430. See 1976-1977 Survey, supra note 1, at 50.
431. 552 S.W.2d 410 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
432. See text accompanying notes 67-75 supra.
433. 553 S.W.2d 85 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
434. Judge Galbreath, dissenting, found the result inconsistent with the
holding in Patmore v. State, 152 Tenn. 281, 277 S.W. 892 (1925). See 553 S.W.2d
at 90 (Galbreath, J., dissenting). In a concurring opinion Judge Daughtrey submitted that Patmore had been overruled sub silentio by State v. Black, 524
S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. 1975), and Duhac v. State, 505 S.W.2d 237 (Tenn. 1973). See
553 S.W.2d at 89 (Daughtrey, J., concurring).
435. 565 S.W.2d 900 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1978).
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used in Gray at face value: "Types of offenders for which consecutive sentencing should be reserved may be classified as follows. "M
As the present case did not fit within any of the specifications,
the dissent concluded that consecutive sentencing was impermissible.
A sentence may only run consecutively to a sentence previously imposed. In Thompson v. Statej following the entry of
a guilty plea, the trial court imposed a sentence to run consecutively to any sentence the accused might thereafter receive in
connection with other charges pending in another county at the
time. The court of criminal appeals held that the language used
in the statute authorizing cumulative sentencing's left no doubt
that "a sentence may only be run consecutively to a previously
imposed sentence."''
3. Enhancement Statutes
A habitual criminal is defined by statute' " as any person
convicted three times of a felony within the state with at least two
of the felonies being among a designated list or convicted three
times of a felony elsewhere with at least two of the felonies such
that they would have been among the same list had they occurred
in Tennessee. If an accused charged with a felony is found guilty
as a habitual criminal, the punishment for the offense is enhanced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. " '
Prior to Evans v.State'z life imprisonment could be imposed
by operation of the statutes upon conviction of the third felony
as long as other conditions were satisfied." 3 As recently as 1975
the Supreme Court of Tennessee declared in Pearson v. State:"'
"The third conviction of one of the prescribed felonies is the
triggering mechanism which brings the habitual criminal statute
436.
437.

538 S.W.2d at 393.
565 S.W.2d 889 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977).

438.

T NN. CODE ANN.

§ 40-2711 (1975).

439. 565 S.W.2d at 890.
440. TmNN. CoDE ANN, § 40-2801 (1975).

441. Id. § 40-2806.
442. 571 S.W.2d 283 (Tenn. 1978).
443. Inaddition to meeting the felony specification requirement, the three
offenses must have been committed on three separate occasions. See Harrison
v. State, 217 Tenn. 31, 394 S.W.2d 713 (1965).
444. 521 S.W.2d 225 (Tenn. 1975).
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into play." 4" In Evans this passage was dismissed as "misleading
dicta,""8 and the supreme court declared to the contrary that
punishment as a habitual criminal can only follow a fourth conviction. However surprising this result may appear, the construction of the statutes given by the court is analytically unassailable.
The punishment enhancement section " 7 is by its terms operative
"when an [sic] habitual criminal . . . shall commit" one of the
enumerated felonies. Thus, "to bring the defendant within the
ambit of the statute, the State must show that he was an [sic]
habitual criminal at the time he committed the principal offense."'" The state may not, therefore, use the offense of the
instant prosecution as an element of the habitual criminal
charge.
Defendant in Evans had previously been convicted of five
felonies: two charges of felonious escape and one charge of crime
against nature all occurring in Tennessee; one charge of larceny
from the person, and one charge of attempted breaking and entering, both taking place in Michigan. Since the instant charge of
burglary was excluded from consideration, two of the prior felonies must have fallen within the specified list to sustain the habitual criminal charge."9 Only two of defendant's prior felonies,
crime against nature and larceny from the person, were even
arguably within the specification, and neither of those were free
of difficulty. The statutory list of infamous crimes'w that are
incorporated into the habitual criminal statute included buggery
and sodomy, which at common law did not include any form of
oral-genital sex. The crime against nature statute,"' however,
had been interpreted to include such acts. 5 2 Therefore, the court
445. Id. at 227.
446. 571 S.W.2d at 285. In a concurring opinion Chief Justice Henry labeled the passage "erroneous dictum." Id. at 288 (Henry, C.J., concurring). He
would appear to be the more accurate as to both words.
447. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2806 (1975).
448. 571 S.W.2d at 285 (emphasis in original).
449. A literal reading of the statute would require both specified felonies
to have been committed either in Tennessee or in Michigan. While such an
interpretation would thwart the purpose of the statute, the fourth felony requirement may be condemned for the same reason, see 571 S.W.2d at 289-90 (Henry,

C.J., dissenting), and the plain meaning is no less obvious in this instance.
450. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2712 (1975).
451. Id. § 39-707 (1975).
452. See Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975); Young v. State, 531 S.W.2d
560 (Tenn. 1975).
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concluded, a crime against nature could qualify as a specified
felony only if the act upon which the conviction was based would
have constituted buggery or sodomy at common law." 3 Less troublesome was the conviction for larceny from the person. The incorporated list of infamous crimes referred simply to larceny, but
the court concluded that the term was intended to encompass all
statutory forms of larceny. The court noted that the statute defining habitual criminality excluded petit larceny from the specified
offenses, a proviso that would have been unnecessary if larceny
in the incorporated statute had not referred to all forms of the
offense. The case was remanded for a new trial on the habitual
criminal count, in respect to which the critical inquiry would
concern the factual basis for the crime against nature conviction.
Since the habitual criminal statute merely enhances the
punishment following conviction of a subsequent felony, Tennessee courts have followed the rule that the accused is not being
placed twice in jeopardy for the prior offenses."' Apparently following the same principle, the court of criminal appeals in
Glasscock v. State' held that following a conviction for grand
larceny the accused could be punished as a habitual criminal,
even though the same three prior felony convictions had been
used to support a habitual criminal charge in a previous trial for
a different felony, and even though the first jury had not found
the accused to be a habitual criminal. Conversely, an accused
could be sentenced under the habitual criminal statute any number of times, using any or all of the same three felonies to prove
the count, as long as each prosecution was brought for a separate
subsequently committed felony.'" If, however, an accused were
convicted of a felony and not sentenced under the habitual criminal statute either because no such charge was brought or the jury
declined to find the charge proven, and, if on appeal the conviction were reversed, the accused probably could not be charged
under the habitual criminal statute on retrial. This result would
appear to follow from the United States Supreme Court's holding
453. Chief Justice Henry, dissenting on this point, contended that "crime
against nature" and "sodomy" were equivalent terms. 521 S.W.2d at 290

(Henry, C.J., dissenting).
454.
455.
456.

See Pearson v. State, 521 S.W.2d 225 (Tenn. 1975).
570 S.W.2d 354 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1978).
See, e.g., Pearson v. State, 521 S.W.2d 225 (Tenn. 1975).
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in North Carolina v. Pearce,"' which precluded greater punishment upon retrial, absent events between the two trials that supported an increase in the sentence. Only in the unlikely event that
the accused had been convicted of a different felony between the
original trial and the trial on remand would a habitual criminal
charge properly be considered at the retrial.
Two constitutional challenges directed at the habitual criminal statute were rejected by the court of criminal appeals in
Marsh v. State."' First, the accused contended that the statute
violated the eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment because it did not provide for the consideration
of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. While such considerations have been held essential insofar as the imposition of capital punishment is concerned,4 5 the court saw no compelling constitutional reason to limit similarly the imposition of a life sentence that could "hardly be likened to the irretrievable infliction
of death." ' " Second, the accused contended that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was violated by the
arbitrary authority of the prosecutor to select those who would be
charged under the statute. While conceding that many defendants eligible for prosecution under the statute were not so
charged, the court held that the use of such discretion was constitutionally irrelevant.16'
Under Tennessee statute"2 the use of a firearm in the perpetration of a felony is itself designated a felony. In State v.
Hudson,123 however, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the
provision did not create a new felony but rather supplemented
other felony statutes by enhancing punishment when a firearm
was employed. The court conceded that the statute defined a
felony separate and distinct from the underlying felony committed by means of the firearm"' but nevertheless concluded that to

-

457.
458.
459.

395 U.S. 711 (1969).
561 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977).
See POST-TRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 5.

460.

561 S.W.2d at 770-71.

461. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962]. The same conclusion was
reached in McPherson v. State, 562 S.W.2d 210 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977), cert.
denied, id. (Tenn. 1978).
462. TENN. CoDE ANN. * 39-4914 (1975).
463. 562 S.W.2d 416 (Tenn. 1978).
464. If the legislature had intended to enact a punishment enhancement
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sustain separate convictions would violate the protection against
double jeopardy.1"
While the bringing of multiple charges may result in double
jeopardy in some cases, the problem is not inherent in the statute.
If, for example, the accused were to use a firearm in the perpetration of rape, no double jeopardy problem would arise in convictions for both rape and use of a firearm in committing a felony.
Under the Blockburger same-evidence test,"' which the court
embraces," 7 "two offenses are distinct and separate if the statutory definition of each requires proof of a fact which the other does
not require."I" In this instance, rape would require proof of carnal
knowledge, which is not required for the firearm offense, and the
firearm charge would require proof of the use of a firearm, which
is not necessary for a conviction of rape. This analysis is equally
persuasive in the present case, in which the two underlying felonies were armed robbery and assault with intent to commit murder. The concession made by the state that the use of the firearm
charge merged into armed robbery was unnecessary. Armed robbery requires proof of larceny, which is not required for the other
charge, and the firearms charge requires proof of the use of a
firearm, which is not required for armed robbery since armed
robbery can be committed by the use of any number of weapons
other than a firearm.'" The same analysis applies to the charge
statute it could easily have done so. Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.62 (West
1975):

ConcealingIdentity. Whoever commits a crime while his usual appearance has been concealed, disguised or altered, with intent to make it
less likely that he will be identified with the crime, may in addition to
the maximum punishment fixed for such crime, in case of conviction
for a misdemeanor be imprisoned not to exceed one year in county jail,
and in case of conviction for a felony be imprisoned not to exceed 5
years.
465. The court cited Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), in which the
Supreme Court acquiesced in a state court determination that joy riding was a

lesser included offense of auto theft.
466. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
467. 562 S.W.2d at 418; id. at 421 (Henry, C.J., concurring).
468. Id. at 418.
469. Id. The court conceded this point but only after it had concluded that
to avoid the double jeopardy problem, the firearms provision must be construed
as a punishment enhancement statute. Even with this construction it concluded
that the statute could not be applied to a charge of robbery by use of a deadly
weapon because even though "'deadly weapon' obviously may include more
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of assault with intent to commit murder. For purposes of double

jeopardy under the Blockburger test, the question is not whether
the same evidence (e.g., use of a firearm) was sufficient for both
offenses, but whether the definitions of the offenses required proof
of the same fact. " '
A similar but less troublesome question was presented to the
Tenneseee Supreme Court in Key v. State."' The Tennessee burglary statute 7 provides for sentence enhancement when the
"person convicted of the crime had in his possession a firearm at
the time of the breaking and entering." 73 Defendant in Key was
not so armed, but his accomplice in the crime was. The court
concluded that the legislative intent was not to impose enhanced
punishment on one in the position of defendant, contrasting the
language of the burglary statute with that used in the robbery
statute-"if the robbery be accomplished by the use of deadly
weapon."'' The robbery statute was "aimed at the methodology
of the crime,"'75 and, therefore, all parties chargeable as principals could be subjected to the more severe punishment. The burglary statute, by contrast, focused upon "the modus operandi of
the individual,""' and, therefore, called for sentence enhancement only in respect to parties actually armed. Nor did the general aiding and abetting statute' call for a different result because first, the reference to aiding and abetting "any criminal
offense" did not encompass an enhanced sentencing provision,
and, second, an offense requiring personal participation may not
be charged through an aiding and abetting provision."' The party
charged need not have exclusive control of the weapon, but
"[clonstructive or joint possession may occur only where the
wje are not convinced that the legislature meant to twice
enhance the penalty for one who commits robbery by means of a firearm." Id.
at 419.
470. See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958). See also Anderson v.
State, 553 S.W.2d 85 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1977) (discussed in text accompanying notes 67-75 supra).
471. 563 S.W.2d 184 (Tenn. 1978).
472. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-901 (1975).
473. Id.
than a 'firearm,'...

474.
475.
476.
477.

563 S.W.2d at 187 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3901 (1975)).

478.

See Looney v. State, 156 Tenn. 337, 1 S.W.2d 782 (1928).

Id.
Id.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-109 (1975).
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personally unarmed participant has the power and ability to exer'
cise control over the firearm."479
N.

Probation

In finding an abuse of discretion in the denial of probation
in Moten v. State,4M° the Tennessee Supreme Court, under the
guise of statutory interpretation, 8 ' held as a matter of public
policy that rehabilitation must take precedence over retribution
and deterrence in the determination of the propriety of punishment. Defendant had pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of petit
larceny, the charge arising from his participation in a scheme to
steal carpeting valued at $3,000 from his employer's warehouse.
The trial court imposed a sentence of nine months in the workhouse and denied probation because of (1) the circumstances and
nature of the offense, (2) the deterrent effect of punishment, and
(3) the reduction of the charge from grand to petit larceny.
The court of criminal appeals affirmed, finding "no indication of arbitrary action on the part of the trial judge,""' 2 but the
Tennessee Supreme Court found none of the reasons given sufficient for denial of probation. In respect to the first factor, the
court noted that defendant had no prior criminal record, no violence was involved in the offense, and the property stolen was all
recovered. Defendant had been verbally enticed and then bribed
to commit the offense. In regard to the second factor, the court
held simply that deterrence is not a legitimate consideration in
deciding whether to grant probation because "deterrence is a factor which is uniformly present" in all cases. 8 The court was
479.

563 S.W.2d at 188. See also Storey v. State (Tenn. Crim. App., Nov.

9, 1978), abstracted inTENN. Arr'v GEN.

ABSTRACT,

Vol. IV, Nos. 5,6, p. 11 (Key

followed in requiring personal use of a weapon under TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4914
(1975): "Any person who employs any firearm ....
..
480. 559 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn. 1977).
481. TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 40-2901 (Cum. Supp. 1977), -2904 (1975).
482. 559 S.W.2d at 770.
483. Id. at 773. "Reliance on this factor is no more realistic or reasonable
than denying probation on grounds that the defendant committed a crime." Id.
('f id. at 774 (Harbison, J., dissenting, "It seems to me to be legitimate for a
trial judge to consider whether the serving of some or all of a sentence would
deter the offender from engaging in further criminal activity. . . . [Ilt can
hardly be contended that every criminal is entitled to a first offense without
serving time."). TENN. ConE ANN. § 40-2904 was amended by 1978 Tenn. Pub.
Acts ch. 911, § 1 to allow trial judges to "deny probation upon the ground of
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similarly displeased with the attitude of the trial court that "the
defendant should pay for his crime," because such an approach
"places retribution above rehabilitation without reason." ' " Finally, on the authority of a decision of the court of criminal appeals ' the supreme court held that the fact that the charge had
been reduced prior to the plea of guilty was "an improper basis
for denial of probation.' "

0.

Double Jeopardy

1. When Jeopardy Attaches
The United States Supreme Court had previously held that
in a jury trial jeopardy attaches at the time the jury is empanelled
and sworn,' 8 but, prior to Crist v. Bretz,'" the issue had never
been raised in the context of a state proceeding. In Crist the
prosecution argued that the federal rule was an arbitrary rule of
convenience, and the state rule-that jeopardy does not attach
until the first witness is swornl4 -uwasequally acceptable for constitutional purposes. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that
the federal rule was "an integral part of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy." "
2. Dismissal of Indictment Subsequent to Trial
In 1975 the Supreme Court held in United States v. Jenkins"I
that a dismissal of an indictment at the close of the evidence
precluded a retrial for reasons of double jeopardy because the
the deterrent effect upon other criminal activity." TIMN. CODE ANN. § 40-2904
(Cum. Supp. 1978).
484. Id. at 773.
485. Mattino v. State, 539 S.W.2d 824 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied,
id. (Tenn. 1976) (discussed in 1976-1977 Survey, supra note 1, at 47-48).

486. 559 S.W.2d at 773. Moten was distinguished in Cronan v. State,
Arr'y GEN. ABSTRACT, Vol. IV, No. 2, p.8, in which the accused, indicted
for murder, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter.
487. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); Green v. United

TENN.

States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). See also Delay v. State, 563 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1977), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1978).
488. 437 U.S. 28 (1978).
489. This was the test used in some jurisdictions in nonjury trials. See
POsT-TUAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 50 at 127 n.68.
490. 437 U.S. at 38.
491.

420 U.S. 358 (1975).
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ambiguity of the reasons for dismissal would require further factual proceedings following a successful governmental appeal.
Jenkins was expressly overruled in United States v. Scott,"2 in
which, at the close of the evidence, the trial court granted defendant's motion for dismissal based on pretrial delay. The Court
held that
the defendant, by deliberately choosing to seek termination of
the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt
or innocence of the offense of which he is accused, suffers no
injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause if the Government is permitted to appeal from such a ruling of the trial
court in favor of the defendant." 3
Should the prosecution be successful on appeal, retrial would be
permitted because the double jeopardy clause "does not relieve a
defendant from the consequences of his voluntary choice.""'
3.

Retrial Following Mistrial

The protection against double jeopardy does not prevent a
retrial following a mistrial if the mistrial was ordered as a matter
of "manifest necessity"" 5 and no other reasons preclude a
retrial."' In Arizona v. Washington"' the first conviction of the
accused was reversed and a new trial ordered because the prosecution had withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense. In
the opening statement to the jury at the second trial, defense
counsel said that at the first trial, "evidence was suppressed and
hidden . . . and purposely withheld." 4 ' At the conclusion of the
opening statements, the prosecutor moved for a mistrial, but the
trial judge withheld ruling on the motion upon the offer of defense
counsel to find some authority supporting the admissibility of
proof of the wrongful suppression of evidence prior to the first
trial. The following morning the prosecutor renewed the motion
492. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
493. Id. at 98-99.
494. Id. at 99.
495. The phrase was first used in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 579 (1824). See generally POST-TRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 55.

496. For example, if the manifest necessity for the mistrial were deliberate
misconduct on the part of the prosecution, retrial would be barred. See POST.
TRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 61.

497.
498.

434 U.S. 497 (1978).
Id. at 499 (quoting from opening argument of counsel for defense).
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for a mistrial, and upon no offer of authority by defense counsel,
the mistrial was granted. The trial judge did not use the phrase
"manifest necessity," nor did he expressly state that alternative
solutions to the granting of a mistrial had been considered. The
state supreme court refused to review the mistrial ruling.
Thereafter, the accused filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in a federal district court alleging that retrial would violate the protection against double jeopardy. The writ was granted
in the absence of any indication in the record that the trial court
had considered alternatives before concluding that a manifest
necessity existed for granting the mistrial. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed.
The Supreme Court reversed. Defense counsel had made no
further argument that the evidence of the prior indiscretions of
the prosecution was admissible, and the Supreme Court agreed
that the argument was improper and highly prejudicial. The
Court submitted that in such circumstances "a trial judge's decision to declare a mistrial based on his assessment of the prejudicial impact of improper argument is entitled to great deference.""49 Nor did the Court deem significant the trial court's failure to use the phrase "manifest necessity" in making its ruling.
The failure to explain the ruling more completely was insignificant as long as the basis for the mistrial order was adequately
disclosed by the record."
At a very early date, the Supreme Court established that the
declaration of a mistrial when the jury is hopelessly deadlocked
may be followed by a new trial on the same charges without
violating the protection against double jeopardy.2' The decision
to dismiss the jury is always subject to challenge on the ground
that the trial judge acted too hastily, and if this is found to be
the case, retrial will be prohibited. 2 Theoretically, a series of
499. Id. at 514.
He has seen and heard the jurors during their voir dire examination.
He is the judge most familiar with the evidence and the background of
the case on trial. He has listened to the tone of the argument as it was
delivered and has observed the apparent reaction of the jurors. In short,
he is far more "conversant with the factors relevant to the determination" than any reviewing court can possibly be.
Id. at 513-14.
500. Id. at 516-17.
501. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
502. See generally POST-TRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 58.
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retrials may continue ad infinitum without raising a double jeopardy issue, m but courts become increasingly receptive to the complaint of the defendant as the proceedings are protracted'1 In
State v. Witt'" defendant had been tried three times for first
degree murder and each trial had ended in a mistrial because of
a deadlocked jury. After the third mistrial the trial court dismissed the charges, and the prosecution appealed. While finding
no constitutionally compelling reason for the dismissal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed in light of "the inherent authority to terminate a prosecution in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion" 5 " when repeated trials have resulted in genuinely
deadlocked juries and little likelihood of a different result in the
future is apparent. The court declined to determine the number
of mistrials necessary to warrant a dismissal and cautioned that
the action of the trial judge would always be subject to review for
abuse of discretion.
While there is nothing explicit in the holding, the court may
be assumed to have envisioned a dismissal with prejudice, which
would preclude the prosecution from pursuing a new indictment
for the same offense. This result would appear to follow from the
observation that "[rlequiring defendants to face additional juries with the continuing prospect of no verdict offends traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." ' 7 If the dismissal
was without prejudice; the prosecution would be only slightly
inconvenienced by the dismissal and the intention of the trial
court would be effectively thwarted. If, on the other hand, the
dismissal is with prejudice, the prosecution will be foreclosed
from reviving the charges, even if newly discovered evidence of
substantial significance led to the conclusion that a conviction
would be more probable.
4.

Retrial Following Reversal for Insufficiency of Evidence

From an early date the United States Supreme Court has
held that an accused who successfully appeals a conviction can503. Id. at 145 n.58.
,504. Id. at 145 n.59.
505. 572 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. 1978).
506. Id. at 917.
507. Id. Even the dismissal of the charges will not create a double jeopardy
defense so long as the dismissal is not based on an evaluation of the evidence.
See PosT-TRLw Riots, supra note 1, § 52.
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not thereafter plead double jeopardy as a bar to retrial 1" Curiously, this principle had been persistently applied even when
the reversal of the conviction was based on an insufficiency of the
evidence." The result made little sense, for had the jury returned
a verdict of not guilty, or had the trial judge directed a verdict of
not guilty, the double jeopardy clause would preclude retrial."0
In Burks v. United States"' the Court finally acknowledged that
in this area "our past holdings do not appear consistent with what
we believe the Double Jeopardy Clause commands,""" and concluded that retrial was constitutionally impermissible when the
prior conviction was reversed for legally insufficient evidence.' 3
In a companion case, Greene v. Massey,"4 the Court underscored
the limited application of Burks by remanding the case for a
determination whether the reversal of the conviction was based
on the insufficiency of the evidence or trial error."5
One casualty of the Burks holding is the Tennessee procedural rule permitting a trial judge, acting as the "thirteenth
juror," to set aside a jury verdict and grant a new trial on grounds
of the preponderance of the evidence without entering a judgment
of acquittal. In State v. Cabbage"' the Tennessee Supreme Court
held that such action could no longer be taken at the trial or
appellate level." 7 Moreover, Burks required that if the evidence
508. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
509. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964); Foreman v. United
States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Bryan
v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950).
510. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
511. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
512. Id. at 12.
513. [Sluch an appellate reversal means that the Government's
case was so lacking that it should not have been submitted to the jury.
Since we necessarily afford absolute finality to a jury's verdict of acquittal-no matter how erroneous its decision-it is difficult to conceive how society has any greater interest in retrying a defendant when,
on review, it is decided as a matter of law that the jury could not
properly have returned a verdict of guilty.
Id. at 16 (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Jones, 580 F.2d 249
(6th Cir. 1978).
514. 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
515. See also United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
516. 571 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn. 1978).
517. Compare Ricketts v. Williams, 248 S.E.2d 673, 674 (Ga. 1978):
[Tihere has always been a distinction between a decision holding the
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is insufficient to warrant a conviction, the trial judge must direct
a verdict of acquittal. In Overturf v. State"8' the supreme court
held that the trial court cannot deny the motion and instead
grant a new trial following a verdict of guilty.
5.

Vacation of Guilty Plea

The Supreme Court has never considered the constitutional
propriety of increasing the charges against an accused following
the vacation of a guilty plea; " but the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that when the accused
pleads guilty to a lesser included offense, subsequent prosecution
for more serious offenses is impermissible.'" In United States v.
Smith the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this limitation was only applicable when lesser included offenses were involved. Thus, when the accused had pleaded guilty to one of five
substantive counts, he could be prosecuted on all five substantive
counts as well as a conspiracy count following vacation of the
plea. 5"
6. Identity of Offenses
In Maples v. State'" the accused had been summarily held
in contempt and fined for instituting fraudulent divorce proceedings in which he gave false testimony. He was thereafter convicted of perjury for the same false testimony, a conviction that
the accused contended was precluded by the protection against
double jeopardy. Distinguishing cases in which the accused had
been formally tried for contempt,12 the Tennessee Supreme Court
"evidence legally insufficient" and the discretionary decision of a trial
court that the verdict is against the "weight of the evidence."
We hold that ... the grant of a new trial by the trial court on the
discretionary ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evi-

dence is legally insufficient so as to bar a second trial under the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Federal Constitution.
518. 571 S.W.2d 837 (Tenn. 1978).

See PosT-TRW. Riowrs, supra note 1, § 80.
Rivers v. Lucas, 477 F.2d 199 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds,
414 U.S. 896 (1973); Mullreed v. Kropp, 425 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1970).
519.

520.

521. 584 F.2d 759 (6th Cir. 1978).
522. See also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), discussed in
text accompanying notes 422-25 supra.
523. 565 S.W.2d 202 (Tenn. 1978).
524. See, e.g., People v. Gray, 36 Ill. App. 3d 720, 344 N.E.2d 683 (1976).
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held that the use of the summary power to punish for contempt
committed in the presence of the court did not preclude a criminal prosecution for the same behavior."' Chief Justice Henry dissented, contending that under the Blockburger test

56

the two

convictions were based on the same evidence. While the same
facts are assuredly the basis of both convictions, the question for
double jeopardy purposes is whether all of the elements of one
offense are subsumed in the other offense. Contrary to Justice
Henry's contention that "[t]he contempt statute and the perjury
statute do not have distinct elements for purposes of this case,""'
the elements of the offenses do not vary with the facts of the
case. 528 Thus, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
Blockburger in Gore v. United States5 1 while sustaining a conviction for three offenses-sale of drugs not pursuant to a written
order; sale of drugs not in the original package; and sale of drugs
with knowledge that they had been unlawfully imported-on the
basis of one sale. A single act of the accused was found to have
violated three provisions of the narcotics law, each with distinct
elements, absent evidence of congressional intent to the contrary.
7.

Lesser Included Offenses

The accused in Jones v. State"' was indicted for burglary,
larceny, and receiving and concealing stolen property, and was
convicted for burglary. On appeal the conviction was reversed,
and upon retrial the accused was convicted of larceny. The accused contended on appeal that the conviction for burglary alone
in the first trial carried the implication of acquittal on the other
525.

"It is a power which in our opinion, is indispensible to the orderly

dispatch and conduct of the business of the courts. Its use is not intended to,
nor should it, immunize the contemnor from prosecution for violation of specific

provisions of the criminal code." 565 S.W.2d at 206.
526. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
527. 565 S.W.2d at 209 (emphasis deleted).
528. The dissent would appear to be confusing the "required evidence"
test, adopted in Blockburger, with the "actual evidence" test, which "focuses
on whether the evidence adduced at trial to prove the lesser offense is an integral
part of the evidence used to prove the greater offense." 7 BALT. L. Rcv. 345, 348
(1978). The latter formulation was explicitly rejected in Harris v. United States,

359 U.S. 19 (1959), and therefore cannot be viewed as compelled by the protection against double jeopardy.
529. 357 U.S. 386 (1958).

530.

569 S.W.2d 462 (Tenn. 1978).
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charges, and, therefore, retrial on these charges was precluded by
the protection against double jeopardy. The argument was, in
principle, undeniably correct. 1 1
At the first trial, however, the judge had instructed the jury
that the burglary charge embraced the larceny charge, and, therefore, the accused could be found guilty of either offense but not
of both. As the Tennessee Supreme Court noted, this instruction
was an incorrect statement of the law. An element of burglary is
the intent to commit a felony (any felony), but the felony does
not have to be committed. 2 Thus, larceny is never subsumed
into burglary, at least in an analytical sense, and, therefore, conviction for both offenses would not run afoul of the protection
against double jeopardy )1 Nevertheless, the instruction placed
the jury verdict in a different light. The court of criminal appeals
concluded that the jury had expressed no opinion on the larceny
charge since the trial judge had denied it the option of finding the
accused guilty of both charges. The Tennessee Supreme Court
was dissatisfied with this analysis because the accused had been
charged with burglary and larceny in the same count. The court
found that the jury, by finding the accused guilty as charged, had
in fact found the accused guilty of both offenses, and, as a result,
upon retrial either or both offenses could be once again considered. 4
531. See POST-TRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 85.
532. See 2 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 410
(1957).
533. This assumes that the same evidence test, as opposed to the same
transaction test, is used. If the second conviction were barred by the same
transaction test, such a result would not be reached for constitutional reasons.
On the other hand, had the accused been found not guilty of one of the two
charges, collateral estoppel might (but not necessarily would) preclude a subsequent trial on the other charge. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
534. The same conclusion had been reached under the reasoning of the

court of criminal appeals. 569 S.W.2d at 464.

